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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

  • Jean-Olivier Hairault
  • François Langot
  • Sébastien Menard
  • Thepthida Sopraseuth

At the end of working life, as well as reducing unemployment benefits, the unemployment-insurance agency could apply pension tax instead of wage tax. First, the pension tax provides greater incentives as the value of re-employment is tax-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement implies that the budgetary return and search incentives associated with the pension tax are considerable. By way of contrast, younger workers have greater search intensity and their future pension taxes are more remote and therefore more heavily-discounted: for them the wage tax is more efficient than is the pension tax. Finally, even in the special case where search intensity is zero close to retirement, perfect risk-sharing across unemployment and retirement is welfare-improving thanks to the pension tax.

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Paper provided by TEPP in its series TEPP Working Paper with number 2012-07.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:tep:teppwp:wp12-07
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