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Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance

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  • Conny Wunsch

    (VU University Amsterdam, CESifo Munich, IZA Bonn, and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how economic theory can be combined with state-of-the-art empirics to make quantitative statements about optimal policy. Using a large administrative data set for West Germany as well as nonparametric and semiparametric estimation techniques, I parameterize the model proposed by Pavoni and Violante (2005, 2007) for the optimal choice of different financial and activation measures for unemployed workers. The parameterized model is used to study the role of job search assistance in optimal welfare-to-work programs and assess the optimality of the West German policy in the period 2000 to 2002. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Conny Wunsch, 2013. "Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 1030-1045, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:95:y:2013:i:3:p:1030-1045
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    Cited by:

    1. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Imperfect Monitoring of Job Search: Structural Estimation and Policy Design," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 75-120.
    2. Helsley, Robert W. & Zenou, Yves, 2014. "Social networks and interactions in cities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 426-466.
    3. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2011. "Monitoring, Sanctions and Front-Loading of Job Search in a Non-Stationary Model," Working Papers 1114, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Nov 2011.
    4. Alessio Brown & Johannes Koettl, 2015. "Active labor market programs - employment gain or fiscal drain?," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), pages 1-36.
    5. Boockmann, Bernhard & Osiander, Christopher & Stops, Michael & Verbeek, Hans, 2013. "Effekte von Vermittlerhandeln und Vermittlerstrategien im SGB II und SGB III (Pilotstudie) : Abschlussbericht an das IAB durch das Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung e. V. (IAW), Tübingen," IAB-Forschungsbericht 201307, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    6. Huber, Martin & Lechner, Michael & Wunsch, Conny, 2015. "Workplace health promotion and labour market performance of employees," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, pages 170-189.
    7. Burt S. Barnow & Jeffrey Smith, 2015. "Employment and Training Programs," NBER Chapters,in: Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, volume 2, pages 127-234 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Alessio Brown & Johannes Koettl, 2015. "Active labor market programs - employment gain or fiscal drain?," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), pages 1-36.
    9. Huber, Martin & Lechner, Michael & Wunsch, Conny, 2013. "The Effect of Firms' Partial Retirement Policies on the Labour Market Outcomes of Their Employees," IZA Discussion Papers 7513, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2013. "Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 9751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Riemer P. Faber & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, pages 60-95.
    12. Bart COCKX & Muriel DEJEMEPPE & Andrey LAUNOV & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2011. "Monitoring, Sanctions and Front-Loading of Job Search in a Non-Stationary Model," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Boockmann, Bernhard & Brändle, Tobias, 2015. "Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working: Do They Help the Older Unemployed Out of Benefit Receipt and Back into the Labor Market?," IZA Discussion Papers 8811, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    14. Nicola Pavoni & Ofer Setty & Giovanni Violante, 2016. "The design of 'soft' welfare-to-work programs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 20, pages 160-180, April.
    15. Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2010. "Training and Search during Unemployment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7779, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Forslund, Anders & Fredriksson, Peter & Vikström, Johan, 2011. "What active labor market policy works in a recession?," Research Papers in Economics 2011:9, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    job search; optimal unemployment insurance; welfare-to-work policies; recursive contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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