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Fiscal Imbalances, Inflation and Sovereign Default Dynamics

Author

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  • Guillard, Michel
  • Sosa Navarro, Ramiro

Abstract

The central question this paper seeks to answer is how monetary policy might affect the equilibrium behavior of default and sovereign risk premium. The paper is based on �one-interest-rate� model. Public debt becomes risky due to an active fiscal policy, as in Uribe (2006), reflecting the fiscal authority’s limited ability to control primary surplus. The insolvency problem is due to a string of bad luck (negative shocks affecting primary surplus). But in contrast to Uribe’s results, as the sovereign debt cost increases (which result from weak primary surplus), default becomes anticipated and reflected by a rising country risk premium and default probability. The default is defined as reneging on a contractual agreement and so the decision is set by the fiscal authority. However, conflicting objectives between fiscal and monetary authority play an important role in leading fiscal authority to default on its liabilities. The characteristic of the government policy needed to restore the equilibrium after the default is also analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillard, Michel & Sosa Navarro, Ramiro, 2009. "Fiscal Imbalances, Inflation and Sovereign Default Dynamics," MPRA Paper 24075, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24075
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24075/1/MPRA_paper_24075.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buiter, Willem H., 1999. "The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," CEPR Discussion Papers 2205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
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    5. Woodford, Michael, 1995. "Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-46, December.
    6. Marco Arena & Carmen Reinhart & Francisco Vázquez, 2006. "The Lending Channel in Emerging Economics: Are Foreign Banks Different?," NBER Working Papers 12340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
    8. Uribe, Martin, 2006. "A fiscal theory of sovereign risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1857-1875, November.
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    17. Ramiro Sosa Navarro, 2005. "Default Recovery Rates and Implied Default Probability Estimations: Evidence from the Argentinean Crisis," Documents de recherche 05-10, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Imbalances; Inflation; Sovereign Risk; Default;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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