Personnel Economics: An Economic Approach to Human Resources Management
The theoretical idea of personnel economics is to apply simple economic principles to the field of human resources management. Personnel economics as a research field has grown rapidly since the first text book on ?Personnel Economics? was published in 1998. The development is driven by new theoretical insights based on institutional and behavioural economics and new empirical methods and data sets. Those new theoretical insights are very fruitful to analyze reasons and consequences of various human resource management practices, to understand what actually drives and motivates employees, and what causes organisations to be successful or to fail. With the new data sets and econometric methods the theories that have been laid out in personnel economics either many years ago or very recently can now be tested thoroughly. And the evidence produced by the new data and methods is strongly supportive, which is not only reassuring for researchers, but it also suggests that practitioners can actually rely on the ideas because they are born out in the data. So, personnel economics is not only a vivid research field, but also of great value for human resource managers, particularly for those taking strategic HR decisions. The fruitfulness of personnel economics is demonstrated with four examples: training strategies of companies, recruiting in tight labour markets, career incentives, team size and effort, and entrepreneurial signalling towards employees and creditors.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
|Date of revision:||Apr 2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Management Revue, April 2004, pages 215-227|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: ++41 1 634 29 27
Fax: ++41 1 634 43 48
Web page: http://www.isu.uzh.ch
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brent Boning & Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2001.
"Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives,"
NBER Working Papers
8306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brent Boning & Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 613-650.
- Uschi Backes-Gellner & Arndt Werner, 2003. "Entrepreneurial Signaling: Success Factors for Innovative Start-Ups," Working Papers 0055, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Mar 2004.
- Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August.
- S.J. Prais, 1981. "Vocational Qualifications of the Labour Force in Britain and Germany," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 98(1), pages 47-59, November.
- Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-54, April.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:87:y:1973:i:3:p:355-74 is not listed on IDEAS
- Holzer, Harry J, 1994.
"Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm: An Empirical Analysis,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 17-36, February.
- Harry J. Holzer, 1990. "Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 3524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Coupé, Tom & Smeets, Valerie & Warzynski, Frederic, 2003. "Incentives in Economic Departments: Testing Tournaments?," Working Papers 03-25, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Sharon M. Oster & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1998. "Aging And Productivity Among Economists," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 154-156, February.
- Steven Tadelis & Jonathan Levin, 2004.
"Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships,"
2004 Meeting Papers
156, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
- Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2003. "Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 155-180, Winter.
- David Austen-Smith, 2002. "Peer Pressure and Job Market Signaling," Discussion Papers 1352, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (IBW IT)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.