IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Rationality of Choices in Subsidized Crop Insurance Markets

  • Xiaodong Du
  • Hongli Feng
  • David A. Hennessy

The U.S. crop insurance market has several features that set it apart from other insurance markets. These include:(a) explicit government subsidies with an average premium subsidy rate of about 60% in recent years; and (b) the legislative requirement that premium rates be set at actuarially fair levels, where the federal government sets rates and pays all costs related to insurance policy sales and services. Bearing these features in mind, we examine to what extent farmers' crop insurance choices conform to economic theory. A standard expected utility maximization framework is set up to analyze tradeoffs between higher risk protection and larger subsidy payments. Given an actuarially fair premium, a rational farmer should choose either the coverage level with the highest premium subsidy or a higher coverage level. Evidence from a large insurance unit level dataset contradicts this theoretical inference, and so suggests anomalous insurance decisions. Mixed logit estimation reveals that larger out-of-pocket premium reduces the probability that an insurance product is chosen.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/14wp545.pdf
File Function: Full Text
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/synopsis/?p=1219
File Function: Online Synopsis
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University in its series Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications with number 14-wp545.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:14-wp545
Contact details of provider: Postal:
578 Heady Hall, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070

Phone: (515) 294-1183
Fax: (515) 294-6336
Web page: http://www.card.iastate.edu/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Du, Xiaodong & Hennessy, David A. & Feng, Hongli, 2013. "A Natural Resource Theory of U.S. Crop Insurance Contract Choice," Staff General Research Papers Archive 36751, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bailey Norwood & Matthew C. Roberts & Jayson L. Lusk, 2004. "Ranking Crop Yield Models Using Out-of-Sample Likelihood Functions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1032-1043.
  3. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, . "Salience and Asset Prices," Working Paper 69726, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  4. Joseph W. Glauber, 2013. "The Growth Of The Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990--2011," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(2), pages 482-488.
  5. Robert Innes, 2003. "Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(2), pages 318-335.
  6. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, . "Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk," Working Paper 29210, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  7. Shapira, Zur & Venezia, Itzhak, 2008. "On the preference for full-coverage policies: Why do people buy too much insurance?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 747-761, November.
  8. Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, 2004. "The Impact of Regret on the Demand for Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 737-767.
  9. Justin Sydnor, 2010. "(Over)insuring Modest Risks," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 177-99, October.
  10. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
  11. Beshears, John & Laibson, David I. & Madrian, Brigitte C. & Choi, James J., 2012. "Simplification and Saving," Scholarly Articles 9925399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, 2001. "Anomalies: Risk Aversion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 219-232, Winter.
  13. Vetter, Stefan & Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions," Discussion Papers in Economics 12740, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  14. Anna Aizer, 2006. "Public Health Insurance, Program Take-Up, and Child Health," NBER Working Papers 12105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Liu, Elaine M. & Huang, JiKun, 2013. "Risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 202-215.
  16. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  17. Train,Kenneth E., 2009. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521747387, Junio.
  18. Bruce J. Sherrick & Peter J. Barry & Paul N. Ellinger & Gary D. Schnitkey, 2004. "Factors Influencing Farmers' Crop Insurance Decisions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(1), pages 103-114.
  19. Géraldine Bocqueho & Florence Jacquet & Arnaud Reynaud, 2014. "Expected utility or prospect theory maximisers? Assessing farmers' risk behaviour from field-experiment data," Post-Print hal-01000072, HAL.
  20. Michael Braun & Peter S. Fader & Eric T. Bradlow & Howard Kunreuther, 2006. "Modeling the "Pseudodeductible" in Insurance Claims Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1258-1272, August.
  21. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 2004. "Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't People Insure Against Large Losses?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, January.
  22. Tomomi Tanaka & Colin F. Camerer & Quang Nguyen, 2010. "Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 557-71, March.
  23. Elaine M. Liu, 2013. "Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1386-1403, October.
  24. Barry K. Goodwin, 2001. "Problems with Market Insurance in Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 643-649.
  25. Barry K. Goodwin & Vincent H. Smith, 2013. "What Harm Is Done By Subsidizing Crop Insurance?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(2), pages 489-497.
  26. Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J., 2012. "Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 67-80.
  27. Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 1991. "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 193-206, Winter.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:14-wp545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.