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Differential pricing and private provider performance

Author

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  • Homrighausen, Pia

    () (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])

Abstract

"In many countries, employment services are contracted out to private providers. However, there is little evidence on the contract design as well as on the effects of differential pricing on private provider performance. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting detailed information on the contract design and compensation of German private employment service providers in 2009 and 2010. Using a comprehensive and unique data set, I estimate average marginal effects of different compensation components on labor market integration in the short and longer run. The estimation results indicate that high performance-independent upfront payments can decrease the reemployment probability of unemployed workers depending on subgroups of clients and characteristics of the private provider (market). High performance-based payments, however, on average have positive effects on private provider performance in the short and longer run. High malus payments on average have no effects on private provider performance." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Homrighausen, Pia, 2014. "Differential pricing and private provider performance," IAB Discussion Paper 201425, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201425
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    File URL: http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2014/dp2514.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephan, Gesine & Uthmann, Sven, 2014. "Akzeptanz von Vergeltungsmaßnahmen am Arbeitsplatz : Befunde aus einer quasi-experimentellen Untersuchung," IAB Discussion Paper 201427, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    2. Gesine Stephan, 2016. "Public or private job placement services—Are private ones more effective?," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 285-285, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    private Arbeitsvermittlung - Erfolgskontrolle; Vertrag; Lohn; Arbeitsvermittlung; Arbeitslose; Vermittlungserfolg; Beschäftigungsdauer;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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