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Is the Contracting-Out of Intensive Placement Services More Effective than Provision by the PES? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

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  • Krug, Gerhard

    () (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg)

  • Stephan, Gesine

    () (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg)

Abstract

There is a longstanding debate on the advantages of quasi-markets for placement services compared to their public deliverance. During 2009, the German Public Employment Service (PES) implemented a randomized field experiment to investigate if intensive services for hard-to-place unemployed individuals can be provided more effectively by such private providers or by PES in-house teams. Unemployed persons were assigned to intensive services for a period of eight months. This paper presents the first results of this experiment; the observation period covers 18 months after assignment. Initial in-house provision reduces accumulated days in unemployment by one to two months. Approximately two thirds of this effect is attributable to labor market withdrawals. The effect on the share of individuals in a given labor market status (unemployed, employed, and withdrawn) occurs mainly during the program period of eight months and disappears by the end of the observation period. We conclude that in a particular environment, the public provision of placement services can be as least as effective as contracting-out - a simple comparison of effectiveness might, however, be misleading.

Suggested Citation

  • Krug, Gerhard & Stephan, Gesine, 2013. "Is the Contracting-Out of Intensive Placement Services More Effective than Provision by the PES? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 7403, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7403
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Belot, Michele & Kircher, Philipp & Muller, Paul, 2015. "Providing Advice to Job Seekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on On-Line Advice," Working Papers in Economics 637, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:exl:22evid:v:2014:y:2014:i:4:p:1-21 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Cockx, Bart & Baert, Stijn, 2015. "Contracting Out Mandatory Counselling and Training for Long-Term Unemployed: Private For-Profit or Non-Profit, or Keep It Public?," IZA Discussion Papers 9459, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Peter Mueser & Marios Michaelides, 2017. "The Labor Market Effects of U.S. Reemployment Policy: Lessons from an Analysis of Four Programs during the Great Recession," Working Papers 18-05, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    5. Marios Michaelides & Peter Mueser, 2018. "Are Reemployment Services Effective? Experimental Evidence from the Great Recession," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 37(3), pages 546-570, June.
    6. Dayanand S. Manoli & Marios Michaelides & Ankur Patel, 2018. "Long-Term Effects of Job-Search Assistance: Experimental Evidence Using Administrative Tax Data," NBER Working Papers 24422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Crépon, Bruno & van den Berg, Gerard J., 2016. "Active Labor Market Policies," IZA Discussion Papers 10321, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. repec:ora:journl:v:1:y:2017:i:2:p:60-73 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Peter Mueser & Marios Michaelides, 2015. "Are Reemployment Services Effective? Experimental Evidence from the Great Recession (WP 15-09 is now WP 18-04)," Working Papers 15-09, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised Feb 2018.
    10. Marios Michaelides & Peter Mueser, 2015. "The labor market effects of U.S. reemployment programs during the great recession," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 08-2015, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    randomized field experiment; contracting-out; intensive placement services;

    JEL classification:

    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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