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Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job-Training Program

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  • Courty, Pascal
  • Marschke, Gerald

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  • Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 1997. "Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job-Training Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 383-388, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:87:y:1997:i:2:p:383-88
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
    3. James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
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    5. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1994. "Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 417-434.
    6. Robert N. McCauley & Rama Seth, 1992. "Foreign bank credit to U.S. corporations: the implications of offshore loans," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Spr, pages 52-65.
    7. French, Kenneth R. & Poterba, James M., 1991. "Were Japanese stock prices too high?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 337-363, October.
    8. Allen B. Frankel & Paul B. Morgan, 1992. "Deregulation and competition in Japanese banking," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 579-593.
    9. Gibson, Michael S, 1995. "Can Bank Health Affect Investment? Evidence from Japan," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 281-308, July.
    10. Sun Bae Kim & Ramon Moreno, 1994. "Stock prices and bank lending behavior in Japan," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    11. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 625-638, August.
    12. Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1993. "Late-Comers to Mass Emigration: The Latin Experience," NBER Historical Working Papers 0047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Henry S. Terrell, 1993. "U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks: a new look," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 913-925.
    14. Slovin, Myron B & Sushka, Marie E & Polonchek, John A, 1993. " The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-266, March.
    15. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1995. "Banks and the availability of small business loans," Working Papers 95-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    16. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    17. Jeremy C. Stein, 1998. "An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 466-486.
    18. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    19. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 393-410.
    20. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September.
    21. Allen B. Frankel & Paul B. Morgan, 1992. "Deregulation and competition in Japanese banking," Proceedings 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Oscar Mitnik, 2008. "How do Training Programs Assign Participants to Training? Characterizing the Assignment Rules of Government Agencies for Welfare-to-Work Programs in California," Working Papers 0907, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    2. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2168-2203.
    3. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2004. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/103, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    4. Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2000. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance Incentives," Discussion Papers 00-12, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    5. Reback, Randall, 2008. "Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1394-1415.
    6. Clare Leaver & Gian Luigi Albano, 2004. "Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 219, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Harald Beyer & Justine Hastings & Christopher Neilson & Seth Zimmerman, 2015. "Connecting Student Loans to Labor Market Outcomes: Policy Lessons from Chile," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 508-513, May.
    8. Sanjog Misra & Harikesh Nair, 2011. "A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, pages 211-257.
    9. Cockx, Bart, 1999. "The Design of Active Labour Market Policies. What Matters and What Doesn't ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999035, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    10. Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2016. "Envy, Schadenfreude and evaluation : understanding the strange growing of individual performance appraisal," Post-Print hal-01366994, HAL.
    11. Andrea Doneschi & Rossana Patron, 2011. "Assessing incentives and risks in training decisions. A methodological note applied to the Uruguayan case," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1511, Department of Economics - dECON.
    12. Alan Benson, 2015. "Do Agents Game Their Agents' Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(4), pages 863-890.
    13. Gian Luigi Albano & Clare Leaver, 2005. "Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/132, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    14. Cullen, Julie Berry, 2003. "The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1557-1589.
    15. Simon Burgess & Marisa Ratto, 2003. "The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/071, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Cullen, Julie Berry, 2003. "The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1557-1589.
    17. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Singh, Prakarsh, 2011. "Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums," MPRA Paper 29403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Propper, Carol & Sutton, Matt & Whitnall, Carolyn & Windmeijer, Frank, 2010. "Incentives and targets in hospital care: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 318-335.
    20. Andrea Doneschi & Rossana Patrón, 2011. "Trabajo y crisis: Lecciones para los programas públicos de capacitación. Notas sobre el caso uruguayo," Investigaciones de Economía de la Educación volume 6,in: Antonio Caparrós Ruiz (ed.), Investigaciones de Economía de la Educación 6, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 48, pages 774-798 Asociación de Economía de la Educación.
    21. Stella Capuano & Andreas Hauptmann & Jans-Jörg Schmerer, 2014. "Trade and Unions: Can Exporters Benefit from Collective Bargaining?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5096, CESifo Group Munich.
    22. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Deborah Wilson, 2002. "Does Performance Monitoring Work? A Review of the Evidence from the UK Public Sector, Excluding Health Care," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/049, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    23. Pascal Courty, 1997. "Strategy communication and measurement systems," Economics Working Papers 330, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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