Welfare-Enhancing Trade Unions in an Oligopoly with Excessive Entry
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- De Pinto, Marco & Goerke, Laszlo, 2016. "Welfare-enhancing Trade Unions in an Oligopoly with Excessive Entry," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145498, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
References listed on IDEAS
- Haucap, Justus & Pauly, Uwe & Wey, Christian, 2001.
"Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-307, September.
- Justus Haucap & Uwe Pauly & Christian Wey, 2000. "Collective Wage Setting When Wages Are Generally Binding: An Antitrust Perspective," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-01, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Naylor, Robin A & Soegaard, Christian, 2014.
"The Effects of Entry in Oligopoly with Bargained Wages,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
1044, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Naylor, Robin & Soegaard, Christian, 2014. "The Effects of Entry in Oligopoly with Bargained Wages," Economic Research Papers 270239, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Svejnar, Jan, 1986.
"Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1055-1078, September.
- Svejnar, J., 1984. "Bargaining power, fear of disagreement and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry," CORE Discussion Papers 1984037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- SVEJNAR, Jan, 1986. "Bargaining power, fear of disagreement, and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry," CORE Discussion Papers RP 720, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2004. "Raising Wages to Deter Entry under Unionization," Discussion Paper Series 155, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Capuano, Stella & Hauptmann, Andreas & Schmerer, Hans-Jörg, 2014.
"Trade and unions: Can exporters benefit from collective bargaining?,"
IAB Discussion Paper
201424, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
- Hauptmann, Andreas & Capuano, Stella & Schmerer, Hans-Jörg, 2015. "Trade and unions: Can exporters benefit from collective bargaining?," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113019, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Stella Capuano & Andreas Hauptmann & Jans-Jörg Schmerer, 2014. "Trade and Unions: Can Exporters Benefit from Collective Bargaining?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5096, CESifo Group Munich.
- Langenmayr, Dominika & Haufler, Andreas & Bauer, Christian J., 2015.
"Should tax policy favor high- or low-productivity firms?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 18-34.
- Langenmayr, Dominika & Haufler, Andreas & Bauer, Christian J., 2012. "Should tax policy favor high- or low-productivity firms?," Discussion Papers in Economics 14277, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Dominika Langenmayr & Andreas Hau fler & Christian J. Bauer, 2013. "Should tax policy favour high or low productivity firms?," Working Papers 1308, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Dominika Langenmayr & Andreas Haufler & Christian J. Bauer, 2012. "Should tax policy favor high- or low-productivity firms?," Working Papers 130, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- Dominika Langenmayr & Andreas Haufler & Christian Josef Bauer, 2012. "Should Tax Policy Favor High- or Low-Productivity Firms?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4034, CESifo Group Munich.
- Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 359-367, December.
- Arghya Ghosh & Hodaka Morita, 2007. "Free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 541-554, June.
- Dewatripont, Mathias, 1987. "Entry deterrence under trade unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 149-156.
- Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "Trade Unions, Wages and Unemployment: What Can Simple Models Tell Us?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 526-545, November.
- Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Raising Wages To Deter Entry Into Unionized Markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 435-445, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
More about this item
KeywordsEndogenous Entry; Oligopoly; Trade Unions; Wage Bargaining; Welfare;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adrian Chadi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iaaegde.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.