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Debt-Deflation versus the Liquidity Trap : the Dilemma of Nonconventional Monetary Policy

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  • Gaël Giraud

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Antonin Pottier

    () (CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement)

Abstract

This paper examines quantity-targeting monetary policy in a two-period economy with fiat money, endogenously incomplete markets of financial securities, durable goods and production. Short positions in financial assets and long-term loans are backed by collateral, the value of which depends on monetary policy. The decision to default is endogenous and depends on the relative value of the collateral to the loan. We show that Collateral Monetary Equilibria exist and prove there is also a refinement of the Quantity Theory of Money that turns out to be compatible with the long-run non-neutrality of money. Moreover, only three scenarios are compatible with the equilibrium condition : 1) either the economy enters a liquidity trap in the first period ; 2) or a credible ex-pansionary monetary policy accompanies the orderly functioning of markets at the cost of running an inflationary risk ; 3) else the money injected by the Central Bank increases the leverage of indebted investors, fueling a financial bubble whose bursting leads to debt-deflation in the next period with a non-zero probability. This dilemma of monetary policy highlights the default channel affecting trades and production, and provides a rigorous foundation to Fisher's debt deflation theory as being distinct from Keynes' liquidity trap.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaël Giraud & Antonin Pottier, 2012. "Debt-Deflation versus the Liquidity Trap : the Dilemma of Nonconventional Monetary Policy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00747904, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00747904
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00747904
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. varelas, erotokritos, 2013. "A Comment on Chicago Rule, Chicago School, and Commercial Bank Seigniorage," MPRA Paper 48770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gaël Giraud & Antonin Pottier, 2016. "Debt-deflation versus the liquidity trap: the dilemma of nonconventional monetary policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 383-408, June.
    3. Maxime Menuet & Alexandru Minea & Patrick Villieu, 2018. "Deficit, monetization, and economic growth: a case for multiplicity and indeterminacy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 819-853, June.
    4. Gaël Giraud & Matheus GRASSELLI, 2017. "The macrodynamics of household debt, growth, and inequality," Working Paper c15af656-d7a4-485c-867f-5, Agence française de développement.
    5. Gaël Giraud & Florent MCISAAC & Emmanuel BOVARI & Ekaterina ZATSEPINA, 2017. "Coping with the Collapse: A Stock-Flow Consistent Monetary Macrodynamics of Global Warming. Updated version: January 2017," Working Paper b6f3f098-ed24-44bf-9cdd-1, Agence française de développement.
    6. Soldatos, Gerasimos T. & Varelas, Erotokritos, 2014. "The Chicago Tradition and Commercial Bank Seigniorage," MPRA Paper 57721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Gaël Giraud & Florent MCISAAC & Emmanuel BOVARI & Ekaterina ZATSEPINA, 2017. "Coping with the Collapse: A Stock-Flow Consistent Monetary Macrodynamics of Global Warming," Working Paper 0f12dfef-5625-4dd1-8f2b-d, Agence française de développement.
    8. Erotokritos Varelas & Gerasimos T. Soldatos, 2014. "The Chicago Tradition and Commercial Bank Seigniorage," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(1), pages 29-38, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    quantitative easing; debt-deflation.; deflation; default; debt-deflation; Banque Centrale; trappe à liquidité; défaut; assouplissement quantitatif; déflation par la dette.; Central Bank; liquidity trap; collateral;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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