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Financial Crashes versus liquidity trap: the dilemma of monetary policy

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Abstract

This paper considers a two-period monetary double auction with incomplete markets of securities and derivatives. Players may share heterogenous beliefs. Short positions in derivatives are constrained by collateral requirements. A central Bank stands ready to lend money or engage in unconventional monetary policy such as quantitative easing. In sharp contrast with the usual picture of equilibrium properties, I show that only three scenarios are compatible with Nash equilibrium condition: 1) either the economy enters a liquidity trap in the first period; 2) or the money injected by the Central Bank fuels a financial inflation driven by "rational exuberance", whose burst leads to a global crash in the next period, 3) else a significant inflation of commodity prices accompanies the functioning of markets. In particular, neither Friedman's golden rule, nor the Taylor rule turn out to be compatible with the third scenario: Both inevitable lead to a liquidity trap. An example shows that quantitative easing does not provide, in general, any escape from the monetary dilemma

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  • Gaël Giraud, 2010. "Financial Crashes versus liquidity trap: the dilemma of monetary policy," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10014, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10014
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank; gains to trade; liquidity trap; collateral; default; crash; Taylor rule; deflation; bubble; rational exuberance; heterogenous belief;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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