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A Comment on Chicago Rule, Chicago School, and Commercial Bank Seigniorage

  • varelas, erotokritos

Chicago rule is shown to be the unique optimal monetary policy rule from the viewpoint of an intergenerational welfare-maximizing social planner. But, in the absence of commercial banking, it really mandates the elimination of the public sector, because it involves the elimination of central bank seigniorage and hence, of the government spending based on this seigniorage, rendering subsequently tax finance incapable of sustaining alone such spending. In the presence of commercial banking, the government does have the option of benefiting from commercial bank seigniorage by borrowing it countercyclically as implied by Chicago rule, which is found to operate like a full-reserve requirement

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48770.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48770
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  1. V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Optimality of the Friedman rule in economies with distorting taxes," Staff Report 158, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Kimbrough, Kent P., 1986. "The optimum quantity of money rule in the theory of public finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 277-284, November.
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  4. Correia, Isabel & Teles, Pedro, 1996. "Is the Friedman rule optimal when money is an intermediate good?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 223-244, October.
  5. Alper, C. Emre & Ardic, Oya Pinar & Mumcu, Ayşe & Saglam, Ismail, 2006. "The welfare effects of government's preferences over spending and its financing," MPRA Paper 1911, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2007.
  6. Todd Keister & James J. McAndrews, 2009. "Why are banks holding so many excess reserves?," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 15(Dec).
  7. Guidotti, Pablo E. & Vegh, Carlos A., 1993. "The optimal inflation tax when money reduces transactions costs : A reconsideration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 189-205, April.
  8. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1997. "The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence," Economics Working Papers 229, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Qi, Jianping, 1994. "Bank Liquidity and Stability in an Overlapping Generations Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 389-417.
  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  11. Gahvari, Firouz & Micheletto, Luca, 2012. "Monetary policy and redistribution: What can or cannot be neutralized with Mirrleesian taxes," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2012:5, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  12. Friedman, Milton, 1971. "Government Revenue from Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 846-56, July-Aug..
  13. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1986. "Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 55-68, January.
  14. Firouz Gahvari, 2009. "Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-advance Constraint," CESifo Working Paper Series 2708, CESifo Group Munich.
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  16. Ireland, Peter N, 1996. "The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 704-23, August.
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