IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cepnwp/hal-01583559.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens

Author

Listed:
  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

There is a vast literature and several surveys on the economic and political resource curse. However, the surveys often fail to capture two points: 1) they disregard the relationship between this recent literature and the staple theory and the staple trap; 2) the appropriability issue has only been treated tangentially and has never been the focus of any survey. The present work fills these gaps. This paper shows that the political resource curse approach initially focused on the appropriability issue through the lens of 'looting' behavior of rebels and distinguished 'lootable' and 'unlootable' goods. However, lootability casts light on mobility of resources or resistance to appropriation rather than state appropriability. Borrowing upon Baldwin's distinction between 'point-source' and 'diffuse' resources, the resource curse literature has recently suggested that state appropriability is related to pointy-resources. The resource curse/blessing assumes that the technical dimension of appropriability and mobility (geographical or purely physical qualities) plays primary role whereas institutional dimensions are either absent or play a secondary role. An alternative approach gives pride of place to the institutional dimension: the same agricultural product such as cereals or coffee can be appropriable or not depending on the institutional structure. Finally, while the literature suffers from a confusion between mobility and appropriability, its relevance in enhancing an appropriative perspective of the state will be underlined.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," CEPN Working Papers hal-01583559, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-01583559
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01583559
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01583559/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ibrahim Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, 2002. "How Much War Will we see?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 307-334, June.
    2. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Nathan Nunn & Nancy Qian, 2011. "The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence From A Historical Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 593-650.
    4. Menaldo,Victor, 2016. "The Institutions Curse," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107138605.
    5. David Wiens, 2014. "Natural resources and institutional development," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(2), pages 197-221, April.
    6. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    7. Torvik, Ragnar, 2001. "Learning by doing and the Dutch disease," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 285-306, February.
    8. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Douglass C. North, 1959. "Agriculture in Regional Economic Growth," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 41(5), pages 943-951.
    10. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
    11. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, 2013. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 22(4), pages 570-615, August.
    12. Papaioannou, Elias & Siourounis, Gregorios, 2008. "Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 365-387, September.
    13. Hodler, Roland, 2006. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
    14. Silje Aslaksen, 2010. "Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(4), pages 421-431, July.
    15. Samuel Bazzi & Christopher Blattman, 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 1-38, October.
    16. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1992. "Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 317-334, December.
    17. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "State Building by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 265-291.
    18. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2000. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," CSAE Working Paper Series 2000-18, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    19. C.B. Schedvin, 1990. "Staples and regions of Pax Britannica," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 43(4), pages 533-559, November.
    20. Nugent, Jeffrey B. & Robinson, James A., 2010. "Are factor endowments fate?," Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 45-82, March.
    21. William Reno, 1997. "Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1997-140, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    22. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2002. "Governance matters II - updated indicators for 2000-01," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2772, The World Bank.
    23. Eoin McGuirk, 2013. "The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 285-313, March.
    24. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370.
    25. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2009. "The Curse of Natural Resources," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 139-156, September.
    26. Kevin Morrison, 2007. "Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 365-386, June.
    27. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
    28. Menaldo,Victor, 2016. "The Institutions Curse," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316503362.
    29. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
    30. Douglass C. North, 1955. "Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 243-243.
    31. Antoine Pietri & Tarik Tazdaït & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 253-278, June.
    32. Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2007. "Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 593-617, September.
    33. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
    34. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. "Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-241, June.
    35. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
    36. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
    37. Auty, R. & Warhurst, A., 1993. "Sustainable development in mineral exporting economies," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 14-29, March.
    38. Mayshary, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika & Pascali, Luigi, 2015. "Cereals Appropriability and Hierarchy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 238, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    39. Michael L. Ross, 2004. "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 337-356, May.
    40. North, Douglass C., 1956. "International Capital Flows and the Development of the American West," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 493-505, December.
    41. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2010. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," Scholarly Articles 4454156, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    42. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    43. Atkinson, Giles & Hamilton, Kirk, 2003. "Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 1793-1807, November.
    44. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer.
    45. Cramer, C., 2002. "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1845-1864, November.
    46. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
    47. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Webb,Steven B. & Weingast,Barry R. (ed.), 2013. "In the Shadow of Violence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107684911.
    48. Leonard Wantchekon, 2002. "Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?," Journal of African Development, African Finance and Economic Association (AFEA), vol. 5(2), pages 145-176.
    49. Matthias Busse & Steffen Gröning, 2013. "The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-20, January.
    50. Macartan Humphreys, 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 508-537, August.
    51. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 303-321.
    52. Jonathan Isham & Michael Woolcock & Lant Pritchett & Gwen Busby, 2005. "The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 19(2), pages 141-174.
    53. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
    54. Emily Harwell & Douglas Farah & Arthur G. Blundell, 2011. "Forests, Fragility and Conflict : Overview and Case Studies," World Bank Publications - Reports 13067, The World Bank Group.
    55. Fearon, James D. & Laitin, David D., 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 75-90, February.
    56. Auty, Richard M., 2001. "The political economy of resource-driven growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 839-846, May.
    57. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-92-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    58. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
    59. Beck, T.H.L., 2011. "Finance and Oil. Is there a Resource Curse in Financial Development?," Other publications TiSEM 123f034a-fde0-4c02-b147-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    60. Ramsay, Kristopher W., 2011. "Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 507-529, July.
    61. Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, 2003. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict : Options and Actions," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15047, December.
    62. Lane, Frederic C., 1958. "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 401-417, December.
    63. Acemoglu, Daron, 1995. "Reward structures and the allocation of talent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, January.
    64. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Webb,Steven B. & Weingast,Barry R. (ed.), 2013. "In the Shadow of Violence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107014213.
    65. Richard M. Auty, 1997. "Natural Resource Endowment, The State And Development Strategy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 651-663.
    66. Jason Sorens, 2011. "Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(5), pages 571-585, September.
    67. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
    68. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
    69. Deacon, Robert T., 2011. "The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 7(2), pages 111-208, December.
    70. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alssadek, Marwan & Benhin, James, 2023. "Natural resource curse: A literature survey and comparative assessment of regional groupings of oil-rich countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    2. Elkhan Richard Sadik-Zada & Wilhelm Loewenstein & Yadulla Hasanli, 2019. "Commodity Revenues, Agricultural Sector and the Magnitude of Deindustrialization: A Novel Multisector Perspective," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-15, November.
    3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "Coercive state, resisting society, political and economic development in Iran," CEPN Working Papers 2017-17, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    4. Lotte Dalgaard Christensen, 2023. "A Bayesian game of resource exploitation in hinterland regions: modelling scenarios for sustainable development," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 277-296, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
    2. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
    3. Alssadek, Marwan & Benhin, James, 2023. "Natural resource curse: A literature survey and comparative assessment of regional groupings of oil-rich countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    4. Dauvin, Magali & Guerreiro, David, 2017. "The Paradox of Plenty: A Meta-Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 212-231.
    5. Kaznacheev, Peter, 2013. "Resource Rents and Economic Growth: Economic and institutional development in countries with a high share of income from the sale of natural resources. Analysis and recommendations based on internatio," EconStor Research Reports 121950, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    6. Dong-Hyeon Kim & Shu-Chin Lin, 2017. "Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(2), pages 363-391, February.
    7. Dauvin, Magali & Guerreiro, David, 2017. "The Paradox of Plenty: A Meta-Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 212-231.
    8. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2012. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions," Scholarly Articles 8694932, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    9. Chi-Swian Wong, 2021. "Science Mapping: A Scientometric Review on Resource Curses, Dutch Diseases, and Conflict Resources during 1993–2020," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-48, July.
    10. Wu, Sanmang & Lei, Yalin, 2016. "Study on the mechanism of energy abundance and its effect on sustainable growth in regional economies: A case study in China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-8.
    11. Rabah Arezki & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned into a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/35, European University Institute.
    12. Brunnschweiler, Christa N. & Bulte, Erwin H., 2008. "The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 248-264, May.
    13. Barbier,Edward B., 2007. "Natural Resources and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521706513.
    14. Abdul HANNAN* & Hasan M. MOHSIN**, 2015. "Regional Analysis of Resource Curse Hypothesis: Evidence from Panel Data," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 25(1), pages 45-66.
    15. Brunnschweiler, Christa N., 2008. "Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 399-419, March.
    16. Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2007. "Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 593-617, September.
    17. Rabah Arezki & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 504-521, August.
    18. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "It's the rents, stupid! The political economy of the resource curse," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5317-5325, December.
    19. Waqar Wadho & Sadia Hussain, 2023. "Ethnic diversity, concentration of political power and the curse of natural resources," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 40(1), pages 113-137, April.
    20. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "Coercive state, resisting society, political and economic development in Iran," CEPN Working Papers 2017-17, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Captive and fugitive assets; Lootable goods; Natural resource curse; Pointy versus diffuse resources; Predatory state; Staple theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-01583559. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.