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Who offers tax-based business development incentives?

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  • Alison Felix
  • James R. Hines

Abstract

Many American communities seek to attract or retain businesses with tax abatements, tax credits, or tax increment financing of infrastructure projects (TIFs). The evidence for 1999 indicates that communities are most likely to offer one or more of these business development incentives if their residents have low incomes, if they are located close to state borders, and if their states have troubled political cultures. Ten percent greater median household income is associated with a 3.2 percent lower probability of offering incentives; ten percent greater distance from a state border is associated with a 1.0 percent lower probability of offering incentives; and a 10 percent higher rate at which government officials are convicted of federal corruption crimes is associated with a 1.2 percent greater probability of offering business incentives. TIFs are the preferred incentive of communities whose residents have household incomes between $25,000 and $75,000; whereas TIFs are much less commonly offered by communities whose residents have household incomes below $25,000. The need to finance TIFs out of incremental tax revenues may make it infeasible for many of the poorest of communities to use TIFs for local business development.

Suggested Citation

  • Alison Felix & James R. Hines, 2011. "Who offers tax-based business development incentives?," Research Working Paper RWP 11-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkrw:rwp11-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:eee:regeco:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:249-259 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Felix, R. Alison & Hines, James R., 2013. "Who offers tax-based business development incentives?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 80-91.
    3. Criscuolo, Chiara & Martin, Ralf & Overman, Henry & Van Reenen, John, 2012. "The Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 6323, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Chiara Criscuolo & Ralf Martin & Henry G. Overman & John Van Reenen, 2012. "Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy," CEP Discussion Papers dp1113, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Michael R. Betz & Mark D. Partridge & David S. Kraybill & Linda Lobao, 2012. "Why Do Localities Provide Economic Development Incentives? Geographic Competition, Political Constituencies, and Government Capacity," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 361-391, September.
    6. Adam Baldwin, 2016. "Tax Increment Financing: Incentivising Real Estate Development Through The Public Sector," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 80-83, February.
    7. Fei, Fan & Hines, James R. & Horwitz, Jill R., 2016. "Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 109-123.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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