IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v94y2016icp109-123.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits?

Author

Listed:
  • Fei, Fan
  • Hines, James R.
  • Horwitz, Jill R.

Abstract

Nonprofit charitable organizations are exempt from most taxes, including local property taxes, but U.S. cities and towns increasingly request that nonprofits make payments in lieu of taxes (known as PILOTs). Strictly speaking, PILOTs are voluntary, though nonprofits may feel pressure to make them, particularly in high-tax communities. Evidence from Massachusetts indicates that PILOT rates, measured as ratios of payments to the value of local tax-exempt property, are higher in towns with higher property tax rates: a one percentage point higher property tax rate is associated with a 0.2 percentage point higher PILOT rate. PILOTs appear to discourage nonprofit activity: a one percentage point higher PILOT rate is associated with 0.8% lower real property ownership by local nonprofits, 0.2% lower total assets, and 0.2% lower revenues of local nonprofits. These patterns are consistent with voluntary PILOTs acting in a manner similar to low-rate, compulsory real estate taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Fei, Fan & Hines, James R. & Horwitz, Jill R., 2016. "Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 109-123.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:94:y:2016:i:c:p:109-123
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2016.06.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119016300195
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jue.2016.06.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. O'Keefe, Suzanne, 2004. "Job creation in California's enterprise zones: a comparison using a propensity score matching model," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-150, January.
    2. Dye, Richard F. & Merriman, David F., 2000. "The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 306-328, March.
    3. Joyce Y. Man, 1999. "Fiscal Pressure, Tax Competition and the Adoption of Tax Increment Financing," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 36(7), pages 1151-1167, June.
    4. Felix, R. Alison & Hines, James R., 2013. "Who offers tax-based business development incentives?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 80-91.
    5. William M. Gentry & John Penrod, 2000. "The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 285-324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    7. George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, 2019. "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 17, pages 525-542, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Neumark, David & Kolko, Jed, 2010. "Do enterprise zones create jobs? Evidence from California's enterprise zone program," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-19, July.
    9. David M. Cutler, 2000. "The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number cutl00-1.
    10. Anderson, John E. & Wassmer, Robert W., 1995. "The decision to 'bid for business': Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 739-757, December.
    11. Keen, Michael & Konrad, Kai A., . "The theory of international tax competition and coordination," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Papke, Leslie E., 1994. "Tax policy and urban development : Evidence from the Indiana enterprise zone program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 37-49, May.
    13. Gibson, Diane, 2003. "Neighborhood characteristics and the targeting of tax increment financing in Chicago," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 309-327, September.
    14. Timothy J. Bartik, 1991. "Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number wbsle, November.
    15. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999. "Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-139, January.
    16. Boarnet, Marlon G. & Bogart, William T., 1996. "Enterprise Zones and Employment: Evidence from New Jersey," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 198-215, September.
    17. Matias Busso & Jesse Gregory & Patrick Kline, 2013. "Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Place Based Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 897-947, April.
    18. Hanson, Andrew, 2009. "Local employment, poverty, and property value effects of geographically-targeted tax incentives: An instrumental variables approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 721-731, November.
    19. Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, 1998. "Industrial Incentives: Competition among American Cities and States," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ii, November.
    20. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
    21. Rohlin, Shawn & Rosenthal, Stuart S. & Ross, Amanda, 2014. "Tax avoidance and business location in a state border model," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 34-49.
    22. Auerbach,Alan J. & Hines, Jr.,James R. & Slemrod,Joel (ed.), 2007. "Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870221, October.
    23. Fei, Fan & Hines, James R. & Horwitz, Jill R., 2016. "Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 109-123.
    24. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
    25. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fei, Fan & Hines, James R. & Horwitz, Jill R., 2016. "Are PILOTs property taxes for nonprofits?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 109-123.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Felix, R. Alison & Hines, James R., 2013. "Who offers tax-based business development incentives?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 80-91.
    2. Gibbons, Stephen & Overman, Henry & Sarvimäki, Matti, 2021. "The local economic impacts of regeneration projects: Evidence from UK's single regeneration budget," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Hanson, Andrew & Rohlin, Shawn, 2013. "Do spatially targeted redevelopment programs spillover?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 86-100.
    4. Stephanie Armbruster & Beat Hintermann, 2020. "Decentralization with porous borders: public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 606-642, June.
    5. Florian MAYNERIS & Loriane PY, 2013. "The Efficiency Of Enterprise Zone Programs Some Conflicting Results?," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 38, pages 209-224.
    6. Carlianne Patrick & Amanda Ross & Heather Stephens, 2016. "Designing Policies to Spur Economic Growth: How Regional Scientists Can Contribute to Future Policy Development and Evaluation," Working Papers 16-04, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    7. Braid, Ralph M., 2009. "The employment effects of a central city's source-based wage tax or hybrid wage tax," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 512-521, July.
    8. Michael P. Devereux & Simon Loretz, 2013. "What Do We Know About Corporate Tax Competition?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(3), pages 745-774, September.
    9. Pender, John & Reeder, Richard, 2011. "Impacts of Regional Approaches to Rural Development: Initial Evidence on the Delta Regional Authority," Economic Research Report 262240, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    10. Tadashi Morita & Yasuhiro Sato & Kazuhiro Yamamoto, 2020. "Demographics and competition for capital in political economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 865-889, August.
    11. Miniaci Raffaele & Panteghini Paolo M. & Rivolta Giulia, 2022. "The estimation of reaction functions under tax competition," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 301-339, May.
    12. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    13. Reynolds, C. Lockwood & Rohlin, Shawn M., 2015. "The effects of location-based tax policies on the distribution of household income: Evidence from the federal Empowerment Zone program," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1-15.
    14. Björn Kauder, 2015. "Spatial Administrative Structure And Intrametropolitan Tax Competition," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 626-643, September.
    15. Janeba, Eckhard & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2023. "The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    16. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.
    17. Gobillon, Laurent & Magnac, Thierry & Selod, Harris, 2012. "Do unemployed workers benefit from enterprise zones? The French experience," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 881-892.
    18. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    19. Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, 2014. "People, Places, and Public Policy: Some Simple Welfare Economics of Local Economic Development Programs," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 629-662, August.
    20. Rosella Levaggi & Paolo M. Panteghini, 2021. "Public expenditure spillovers: an explanation for heterogeneous tax reaction functions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(3), pages 497-514, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:94:y:2016:i:c:p:109-123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.