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An Empirical Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the US

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Abstract

We evaluate the economic costs and benefits for bank capital levels in the United States. The framework and analysis is similar to that found in previous studies though we tailor the analysis to the specific features and experience of the U.S. financial system and account for the impact of new financial regulations. The conceptual framework identifies the benefits of bank capital with a lower probability of financial crises, which result in decreased economic output. The costs of bank capital are identified with increases in banks cost of funding, which are passed along to borrowers and result in a lower level of economic output. Optimal capital maximize the difference between benefits and costs or net benefits. Using a range of empirical estimates of net benefits we find that the optimal level of bank capital in the United States ranges from just over 13 percent to over 26 percent.

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  • Simon Firestone & Amy Lorenc & Ben Ranish, 2017. "An Empirical Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the US," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-034, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-34
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2017.034
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    Cited by:

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    6. Miguel Faria-e-Castro, 2019. "A Quantitative Analysis of Countercyclical Capital Buffers," Working Papers 2019-008, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 01 Jan 2020.
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    8. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Dimitrov, Daniel, 2023. "Macroprudential Regulation: A Risk Management Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 17846, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    10. Ambrocio, Gene & Jokivuolle, Esa, 2017. "Should bank capital requirements be less risk-sensitive because of credit constraints?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/2017, Bank of Finland.
    11. Dia, Enzo & VanHoose, David, 2023. "Macroprudential regulatory policies with a dominant-bank oligopoly and fringe banks," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Capital; Cost benefit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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