IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Housing market regulation and the social demand for job protection

  • Decreuse, Bruno
  • van Ypersele, Tanguy

Controlling for country fixed effects, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of housing market regulation (HMR) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in OECD countries. We provide a model in which HMR increases foreclosure costs in case of mortgage default, while EPL raises the administrative cost of dismissal. Owing to banks lending behavior, individuals' demand for job protection increases with the cost of foreclosure. We use the model to discuss social housing and family insurance, the case for mortgage unemployment insurance, regulations on the use of fixed-term contracts, the impact of min down-payment policies, feed-back effects from HMR to EPL, and the failure of a 2006 French reform of the labor contracts.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7845
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7845.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7845
Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Marco Buti & Alessandro Turrini & Paul Van den Noord & Pietro Biroli, 2010. "Reforms and re-elections in OECD countries," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 25, pages 61-116, 01.
  2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Chiuri, Maria Concetta & Jappelli, Tullio, 2001. "Financial Market Imperfections and Home Ownership: A Comparative Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 2717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Luca Nunziata & Stefano Staffolani, 2007. "Short-Term Contracts Regulations And Dynamic Labour Demand: Theory And Evidence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 54(1), pages 72-104, 02.
  5. Gwilym Pryce & Margaret Keoghan, 2002. "Unemployment insurance for mortgage borrowers: is it viable and does it cover those most in need?," European Journal of Housing Policy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 87-114, April.
  6. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2006. "Job Protection: The Macho Hypothesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 390-410, Autumn.
  7. Alison L. Booth & Marco Francesconi & Jeff Frank, 2002. "Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones Or Dead Ends?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F189-F213, June.
  8. Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2009. "Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 111-45, January.
  9. Gayle Allard, 2005. "Measuring job security over time: in search of a historical indicator for EPL," Working Papers Economia wp05-17, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
  10. Aron Balas & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2009. "The Divergence of Legal Procedures," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 138-62, August.
  11. Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo, 2006. "The Shortcomings of a Partial Release of Employment Protection Laws; The Case of the 2005 French Reform," IMF Working Papers 06/301, International Monetary Fund.
  12. R Blundell & Steven Bond, . "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model," Economics Papers W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  13. O Blanchard & A Landier, 2002. "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed--Term Contracts in France," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F214-F244, June.
  14. Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2001. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 14 Jan 2006.
  15. Becker, Sascha O. & Bentolila, Samuel & Fernandes, Ana & Ichino, Andrea, 2005. "Youth Emancipation and Perceived Job Insecurity of Parents and Children," CEPR Discussion Papers 5338, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Deng, Yongheng & Quigley, John M. & Van Order, Robert & Mac, Freddie, 1996. "Mortgage default and low downpayment loans: The costs of public subsidy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 263-285, June.
  17. Gilles Saint Paul, 1999. "The political economy of employment protection," Economics Working Papers 355, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  18. Adriana Kugler & Giovanni Pica, 2003. "Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market," Economics Working Papers 722, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  19. Andrea Ichino & Fabrizia Mealli & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "From temporary help jobs to permanent employment: what can we learn from matching estimators and their sensitivity?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 305-327.
  20. Luis Diaz-Serrano, 2005. "On the Negative Relationship between Labor Income Uncertainty and Homeownership: Risk Aversion vs. Credit Constraints," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1460105, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  21. Juan Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Labor," Working Paper 19483, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  22. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Jahn, Elke J. & Rosholm, Michael, 2010. "Looking Beyond the Bridge: How Temporary Agency Employment Affects Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 10-6, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  24. Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2009. "Beyond Eurosclerosis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 24, pages 409-461, 07.
  25. Matteo Picchio, 2008. "Temporary Contracts and Transitions to Stable Jobs in Italy," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 22(s1), pages 147-174, 06.
  26. Piet M.A. Eichholtz, 1995. "Regional Economic Stability and Mortgage Default Risk in the Netherlands," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 23(4), pages 421-439.
  27. Lazear, Edward P, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726, August.
  28. Diaz-Serrano, Luis, 2005. "Income volatility and residential mortgage delinquency across the EU," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 153-177, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.