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Housing market regulation and the social demand for job protection

Listed author(s):
  • Decreuse, Bruno
  • van Ypersele, Tanguy

Controlling for country fixed effects, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of housing market regulation (HMR) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in OECD countries. We provide a model in which HMR increases foreclosure costs in case of mortgage default, while EPL raises the administrative cost of dismissal. Owing to banks' lending behavior, individuals' demand for job protection increases with the cost of foreclosure. We use the model to discuss social housing and family insurance, the case for mortgage unemployment insurance, the impact of min down-payment policies, regulations on the use of fixed-term contracts, the failure of a 2006 French reform of labor contracts, and feed-back effects from HMR to EPL.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272711000892
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 95 (2011)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
Pages: 1397-1409

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1397-1409
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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