IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pwa555.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Yuntong Wang

Personal Details

First Name:Yuntong
Middle Name:
Last Name:Wang
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwa555
Department of Economics, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4
Terminal Degree:2000 Département de Sciences Économiques; Université de Montréal (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Windsor

Windsor, Canada
http://www.uwindsor.ca/economics/

(519) 253-4232 ext 2368
(519) 973-7096
401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4
RePEc:edi:dwindca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Dong, Baomin & Ni, Debing & Wang, Yuntong, 2012. "Sharing a polluted river network," MPRA Paper 38839, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Dong, Baomin & Guo, Guixia & Wang, Yuntong, 2012. "Highway toll pricing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 744-751.
  2. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
  3. Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.
  4. Lu, Hu & Wang, Yuntong, 2010. "Efficient trading with nonlinear utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 595-606, July.
  5. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2009. "Efficient trading with restriction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 319-334, December.
  6. Ni, Debing & Wang, Yuntong, 2007. "Sharing a polluted river," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 176-186, July.
  7. YunTong Wang, 2003. "Simple random order methods to share costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 295-314, December.
  8. YunTong Wang, 2002. "original papers : Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 205-211.
  9. Wang, YunTong, 1999. "The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 187-192, August.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dong, Baomin & Ni, Debing & Wang, Yuntong, 2012. "Sharing a polluted river network," MPRA Paper 38839, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Hougaard, J. & Moreno-Ternero, J. & Tvede, M. & Osterdal, L., 2015. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," CORE Discussion Papers 2015031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. van den Brink, R. & van der Laan, G. & Herings, P.J.J. & Talman, A.J.J., 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Other publications TiSEM 97042492-4b03-4e72-b88d-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    5. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2016. "Sharing Sequential Values in a Network," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 3-2017, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    6. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
    7. van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping, 2018. "Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 182-205.
    8. René van den Brink, 2017. "Games with a Permission Structure: a survey on generalizations and applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Ciardiello, F. & Genovese, A. & Simpson, A., 2019. "Pollution responsibility allocation in supply networks: A game-theoretic approach and a case study," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 211-217.
    10. Encarnacion Algaba & René van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2015. "Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-007/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    12. Abraham, Anand & Ramachandran, Parthasarathy, 2020. "A solution for the flood cost sharing problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).

Articles

  1. Dong, Baomin & Guo, Guixia & Wang, Yuntong, 2012. "Highway toll pricing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 744-751.

    Cited by:

    1. Ruben Juarez & Michael Wu, 2019. "Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, April.
    2. Kuipers, Jeroen & Mosquera, Manuel A. & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 158-168.
    3. Li, Xun & Rey, David & Dixit, Vinayak V., 2018. "An axiomatic characterization of fairness in transport networks: Application to road pricing and spatial equity," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 142-157.
    4. Dan C. Popescu & Philip Kilby, 2020. "Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 289(2), pages 341-362, June.
    5. Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M., 2017. "Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 161-170.

  2. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.

    Cited by:

    1. António Osório, 2017. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 357-377, March.
    2. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Working Papers 2012.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2013. "Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions," Other publications TiSEM b72ed3dc-ecc8-49d4-86af-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    6. Li, Zhi & Zhang, Xin & Xu, Wenchao, 2018. "Water Transactions along a River: A Multilateral Bargaining Experiment with a Veto Player," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274048, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Lea Melnikovová, 2017. "Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 1393-1401.
    8. Shivshanker Singh Patel & Parthasarathy Ramachandran, 2019. "A Bilateral River Bargaining Problem with Negative Externality," Papers 1912.05844, arXiv.org.
    9. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Genjiu Xu, 2019. "Sharing a Polluted River under Waste Flow Control," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    10. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    11. René Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2014. "Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 173-194, June.
    12. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    13. R. Delille & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2014. "The seawall bargaining game," Post-Print hal-02485113, HAL.
    14. Hurt, Wesley & Osório, António (António Miguel), 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/237596, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    15. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought," IDEI Working Papers 695, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    16. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
    17. Li, Y.P. & Liu, J. & Huang, G.H., 2014. "A hybrid fuzzy-stochastic programming method for water trading within an agricultural system," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 71-83.
    18. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Maria Gomez-Rua & Elena Molis, 2018. "Allocating the costs of cleaning a river; estimating responsibilities versus incentive compatibility," ThE Papers 18/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    20. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
    21. van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping, 2018. "Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 182-205.
    22. Osorio, Antonio, 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," MPRA Paper 56690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Grundel, S., 2015. "Essays on cooperation in resource allocation and scheduling," Other publications TiSEM c2d78915-6b6f-4f8b-b601-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    24. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2016. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/266574, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    25. Soesja Grundel & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2019. "Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 37-54, April.
    26. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    27. Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.

  4. Lu, Hu & Wang, Yuntong, 2010. "Efficient trading with nonlinear utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 595-606, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    2. Suh, Eunju & Tsai, Henry, 2013. "Examining the relationship between poker and the gaming volumes of Las Vegas hotel casinos," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(9), pages 1651-1658.

  5. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2009. "Efficient trading with restriction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 319-334, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.

  6. Ni, Debing & Wang, Yuntong, 2007. "Sharing a polluted river," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 176-186, July.

    Cited by:

    1. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Hougaard, J. & Moreno-Ternero, J. & Tvede, M. & Osterdal, L., 2015. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," CORE Discussion Papers 2015031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. van den Brink, R. & van der Laan, G. & Herings, P.J.J. & Talman, A.J.J., 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Other publications TiSEM 97042492-4b03-4e72-b88d-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2016. "Sharing Sequential Values in a Network," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 3-2017, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    5. Beard, Rodney, 2011. "The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists," MPRA Paper 34382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Christian Trudeau & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017. "Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Working Papers 1705, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    7. René van den Brink, 2009. "Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-108/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
    9. Nikola Tarashev & Mathias Drehmann, 2011. "Measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks," BIS Working Papers 342, Bank for International Settlements.
    10. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
    11. van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping, 2018. "Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 182-205.
    12. René van den Brink, 2017. "Games with a Permission Structure: a survey on generalizations and applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Jie He & Anping Huang & Luodan Xu, 2015. "Spatial heterogeneity and transboundary pollution: a contingent valuation study on the Xijiang River drainage basin in south China," Cahiers de recherche 15-04, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    14. van den Brink, René & Katsev, Ilya & van der Laan, Gerard, 2010. "An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 817-826, December.
    15. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Martínez, Ricardo, 2014. "Cost allocation in asymmetric trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(3), pages 975-987.
    16. Encarnacion Algaba & René van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2015. "Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-007/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    18. Encarnación Algaba & Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2013. "Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-207/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Bergantiños, Gustavo & González-Díaz, Julio & González-Rueda, Ángel M. & P. Fernández de Córdoba, María, 2017. "Loss allocation in energy transmission networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 69-97.
    20. Yokote, Koji & Funaki, Yukihiko & Kamijo, Yoshio, 2017. "Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-9.
    21. Abraham, Anand & Ramachandran, Parthasarathy, 2020. "A solution for the flood cost sharing problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).

  7. YunTong Wang, 2003. "Simple random order methods to share costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 295-314, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.),Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357, Elsevier.

  8. YunTong Wang, 2002. "original papers : Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 205-211.

    Cited by:

    1. Babusiaux, Denis & Pierru, Axel, 2009. "Modelling and allocation of CO2 emissions in a multiproduct industry: The case of oil refining," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 84(7-8), pages 828-841, July.
    2. Axel Pierru, 2005. "Allocating the CO2 emissions of an oil refinery with Aumann-Shapley prices," Working Papers hal-02468384, HAL.

  9. Wang, YunTong, 1999. "The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 187-192, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2013. "A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 439-460, May.
    2. Albizuri, M.J. & Díez, H. & Sarachu, A., 2014. "Monotonicity and the Aumann–Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(2), pages 560-565.
    3. Trudeau, Christian, 2009. "Cost sharing with multiple technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 695-707, November.
    4. Boonen, T.J., 2014. "Game-theoretic approaches to optimal risk sharing," Other publications TiSEM 5b1d2a57-dd10-437d-9f9b-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 737-765, September.
    6. MOULIN, Hervé & SPRUMONT, Yves., 2002. "Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing," Cahiers de recherche 2002-19, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    7. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing," Working Papers 2003-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    8. Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 275-312, August.
    9. Eric Bahel & Hans Haller, 2012. "Cycles with Undistinguished Actions and Extended Rock-Paper-Scissors Games," Working Papers e07-35, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Moulin, Herve & Vohra, Rakesh, 2003. "Characterization of additive cost sharing methods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 399-407, September.
    11. Wang, Yun-Tong & Zhu, Daxin, 2002. "Ordinal proportional cost sharing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 215-230, May.
    12. SPRUMONT, Yves & MOULIN, Hervé, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 2005-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    13. Boonen, Tim J. & De Waegenaere, Anja & Norde, Henk, 2020. "A generalization of the Aumann–Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 277-287.
    14. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.),Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357, Elsevier.
    15. Derks, Jean, 2005. "A new proof for Weber's characterization of the random order values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 327-334, May.
    16. Hervé Moulin, 2002. "The proportional random allocation of indivisible units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 381-413.
    17. Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2013. "Additive cost sharing on a tree," Working Papers 1307, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    18. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2014. "Shapley–Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 261-285, August.
    19. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 126-144, October.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (1) 2012-05-22
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2012-05-22
  3. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2012-05-22

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Yuntong Wang should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.