# Elsevier

# Journal of Economic Theory

**Download restrictions:**Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

**Current editor:**A. Lizzeri

**Editor:**

Additional information is available for the following
registered editor(s): Jess Benhabib
Alessandro Lizzeri
Karl Shell
**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact
(Zhang, Lei)**

**Series handle:**repec:eee:jetheo

**ISSN:**0022-0531

**Citations RSS feed:**at CitEc

### Impact factors

- Simple (last 10 years)
- Recursive (10)
- Discounted (10)
- Recursive discounted (10)
- H-Index (10)
- Aggregate (10)

**Access and download statistics**

**Top item:**

- By citations
- By downloads (last 12 months)

### 1996, Volume 69, Issue 1

**134-152 A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic***by*Muthoo, Abhinay**186-197 Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money***by*Hurkens, Sjaak**198-204 On Regular Symmetric Economies***by*Prechac, Christophe**205-210 A Completeness Result for Extending Signed Orders***by*Yunfeng, Luo & Chaoyuan, Yue & Ting, Chen**211-217 The Impact of Financial Intermediaries on Stationary Interest Rates***by*Prechac, Christophe**218-226 Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures***by*Qin, Cheng-Zhong**227-233 Multi-Product Serial Cost Sharing: An Incompatibility with the Additivity Axiom***by*Kolpin, Van**234-239 Extraction of Surplus under Adverse Selection: The Case of Insurance Markets***by*Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac**240-254 Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems***by*Alcalde, Jose**255-261 A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule***by*Dagan, Nir**262-277 Existence of Equivalent Martingale Measures in Finite Dimensional Securities Markets***by*Girotto, Bruno & Ortu, Fulvio

### 1996, Volume 68, Issue 2

**279-302 Perfect Correlated Equilibria***by*Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois**303-318 Arrow's Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies***by*Duggan, John**319-348 Stability of Competitive Equilibrium with Respect to Recursive and Learning Processes***by*Balasko, Yves & Royer, Daniel**349-379 Information, Liquidity, and Asset Trading in a Random Matching Game***by*Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Werner, Ingrid M.**380-396 Rationalizable Predatory Pricing***by*Roth, David**397-424 A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility***by*Robson, Arthur J.**425-439 Nash Implementation of Matching Rules***by*Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun**440-455 Optimal Repeated Purchases When Sellers Are Learning about Costs***by*Burguet, Roberto**456-479 Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set***by*Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens**480-509 Voting with Ballots and Feet: Existence of Equilibrium in a Local Public Good Economy***by*Konishi, Hideo**510-530 On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal***by*Jost, Peter-Jurgen**531-543 Cores and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities and Lotteries***by*Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong**544-548 Correlated Equilibrium of Cournot Oligopoly Competition***by*Liu, Luchuan**549-561 Ranking Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders***by*Smith, James L. & Levin, Dan

### 1996, Volume 68, Issue 1

**1-25 Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements***by*Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel**26-48 Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games***by*Gresik, Thomas A.**49-63 Excess Demand Functions and Incomplete Markets***by*Bottazzi, Jean-Marc & Hens, Thorsten**64-76 The Positive Economics of Methodology***by*Kahn, James A. & Landsburg, Steven E. & Stockman, Alan C.**77-110 Axiomatizing Ordinal Welfare Egalitarianism When Preferences May Vary***by*Sprumont, Yves**111-132 A Model of Fiat Money and Barter***by*Hayashi, Fumio & Matsui, Akihiko**133-148 On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models***by*Balder, Erik J.**149-173 A General Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth with Human and Physical Capital: Balanced Growth and Transitional Dynamics***by*Bond, Eric W. & Wang, Ping & Yip, Chong K.**174-199 An Axiomatic Approach to "Preference for Freedom of Choice"***by*Puppe, Clemens**200-211 Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics***by*Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin**212-233 Coalitional Power Structure in Stochastic Social Choice Functions with an Unrestricted Preference Domain***by*Nandeibam, Shasikanta**234-248 Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game***by*Cressman, R.**249-257 A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept***by*Ferreira, Jos e Luis**258-265 Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests***by*Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S.**266-275 Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting***by*Cooper, David J.

### 1995, Volume 67, Issue 2

**299-326 The Assessment of Large Compounds of Independent Gambles***by*Hellwig Martin F.**327-369 Profitable Informed Trading in a Simple General Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing***by*Dow James & Gorton Gary**370-401 Comparative Statics of the Firm***by*Topkis Donald M.**402-435 A Schur Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-expected Utility Preferences***by*Hong Chew Soo & Hui Mao Mei**436-466 Bertrand and Walras Equilibria in Large Economies***by*Funk Peter**467-496 Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining***by*Shi Shougong**497-519 Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games***by*Jeheil Phillippe**520-530 Revisiting Dynamic Duopoly with Consumer Switching Costs***by*Padilla A. Jorge**531-555 A Model of Auction Contracts with Liquidated Damages***by*Waehrer Keith**556-565 Economies with a Unique Equilibrium: A Simple Proof of Arc-connectedness in the Two-Agent Case***by*Balasko Yves**566-577 On the Existence of Endogenous Cycles***by*Balasko Yves & Ghiglino Christian**578-589 Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information***by*Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto**590-598 Temporary Equilibrium Dynamics with Bayesian Learning***by*Chatterji Shurojit**599-608 Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof***by*Serizawa Shigehiro

### 1995, Volume 67, Issue 1

**1-39 (s, S) Equilibria in Stochastic Games***by*Dutta Prajit K. & Rustichini Aldo**40-82 Uncertainty, Risk-Neutral Measures and Security Price Booms and Crashes***by*Epstein Larry G. & Wang Tan**83-105 Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion***by*McAfee R. Preston**106-128 Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice***by*Machina Mark J. & Schmeidler David**129-152 Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizons***by*Bernheim B. Douglas & Dasgupta Aniruddha**153-177 Transactions Costs, Technological Choice, and Endogenous Growth***by*Bencivenga Valerie R. & Smith Bruce D. & Starr Ross M.**178-204 The Speed of Information Revelation in a Financial Market Mechanism***by*Vives Xavier**205-222 The Real Value of Money under Endogenous Beliefs***by*Bertocchi Graziella & Wang Yong**223-250 Evolution and Market Competition***by*Luo Guo Ying**251-265 Multidimensional Generalizations of the Relative and Absolute Inequality Indices: The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen Approach***by*Tsui Kai-Yuen**266-284 Perceptrons Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma***by*Cho In-Koo**285-294 A Market to Implement the Core***by*Serrano Roberto

### 1995, Volume 66, Issue 2

**313-351 Consistent Bayesian Aggregation***by*Mongin Philippe**352-369 Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market***by*Ma Jinpeng**370-405 Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability***by*Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J.**406-436 Sequential Indeterminacy in Production Economies***by*Mandler Michael**437-462 Industrialization under Perfect Foresight: A World Economy with a Continuum of Countries***by*Kaneda Mitsuhiro**463-487 Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade***by*Lagunoff Roger D.**488-506 Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment***by*Phelan Christopher**507-521 A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings***by*Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan**522-535 The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited***by*Gollier Christian**536-547 Stability and the Chain Store Paradox***by*Govindan Srihari**548-572 Optimal Public Utility Pricing: A General Equilibrium Analysis***by*Kamiya Kazuya**573-580 An Alternative Proof of Ben Porath and Gilboa's Generalized Gini Characterization Theorem***by*Weymark John A.**581-589 A Note on Randomized Social Choice and Random Dictatorships***by*Nandeibam Shasikanta**590-598 Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination***by*Muthoo Abhinay**599-608 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs***by*Neme Alejandro & Quintas Luis**609-614 Output Shares in Bilateral Agency Contracts***by*Neary Hugh M. & Winter Ralph A.**615-625 Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals***by*Boylan Richard T.**626-631 Structure of Pareto Optima When Agents Have Stochastic Recursive Preferences***by*Kan Rui**632-636 The Substitution Theorem***by*Raa Thijs Ten

### 1995, Volume 66, Issue 1

**1-32 A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games***by*Dutta Prajit K.**33-63 Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms***by*Edlin Aaron S. & Epelbaum Mario**64-88 Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance***by*Atkeson Andrew & Lucas Jr. , Robert E.**89-112 Bargaining a Monetary Union***by*Chang Roberto**113-138 Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy***by*Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip**139-157 Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?***by*Khalil Fahad & Lawarree Jacques**158-177 Nonconvex Production Economies***by*Suzuki Takashi**178-197 Martingales and Arbitrage in Securities Markets with Transaction Costs***by*Jouini Elyes & Kallal Hedi**198-223 Intransitivity of Indifference, Strong Monotonicity, and the Endowment Effect***by*Sileo Patrick W.**224-237 Continuous Strategy Games as Location Games***by*Knoblauch Vicki**238-263 On Countervailing Incentives***by*Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A.**264-274 On the Invariance of a Mean Voter Theorem***by*Ma Barry K. & Weiss Jeffrey H.**275-288 Experimentation and Learning in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly***by*Harrington Jr. , Joseph E.**289-306 Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games***by*Dutta Prajit K.

### 1995, Volume 65, Issue 2

**303-326 Acyclicity and Dynamic Stability: Generalizations and Applications***by*Boldrin Michele & Montrucchio Luigi**327-358 Insurance, Adverse Selection, and Cream-Skimming***by*Lewis Tracy R. & Sappington David E. M.**359-382 Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games***by*Blume Andreas & Sobel Joel**383-414 Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications***by*Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael**415-434 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection***by*Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori**435-467 Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information***by*Osano H.**468-504 Ideal Structures of Path Independent Choice Functions***by*Johnson Mark R.**505-521 Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem***by*Fleurbaey Marc**522-556 On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information***by*Nagarajan S.**557-574 The Arbitrage Pricing Theorem with Non-expected Utility Preferences***by*Kelsey David & Milne Frank**575-584 Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret***by*Vincent Daniel R.**585-599 Jamming a Rival's Learning***by*Creane Anthony**600-610 On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium under Imperfect Monitoring***by*Chen Kong-Pin**611-623 On the Existence of Nonoptimal Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Economies***by*Greenwood Jeremy & Huffman Gregory W.**624-626 A Theorem on Portfolio Separation with General Preferences***by*Lwebel Arthur & Perraudin William**627-634 Risk Avoidance under Limited Liability***by*Suen Wing**635-639 A Simple Proof of a Basic Result in Nonexpected Utility Theory***by*Conlon John R.

### 1995, Volume 65, Issue 1

**1-42 Financial Market Innovation and Security Design: An Introduction***by*Duffie Darrell & Rahi Rohit**43-78 Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets Economies with Several Consumption Goods***by*Elul Ronel**79-116 Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model***by*Pesendorfer Wolfgang**117-135 Financial Innovation and Arbitrage Pricing in Frictional Economies***by*Chen Zhiwu**136-170 Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market***by*Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew**171-197 Optimal Incomplete Markets with Asymmetric Information***by*Rahi Rohit**198-217 Endogenous Determination of the Degree of Market-Incompleteness in Futures Innovation***by*Ohashi Kazuhiko**218-232 Optimality of Incomplete Markets***by*Demange Gabrielle & Laroque Guy**233-257 Private Information and the Design of Securities***by*Demange Gabrielle & Laroque Guy**258-298 Commission-Revenue Maximization in a General Equilibrium Model of Asset Creation***by*Hara Chiaki

### 1994, Volume 64, Issue 2

**305-324 Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction***by*Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa**325-371 Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games***by*Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M.**372-389 Efficient Monetary Equilibrium: An Overlapping Generations Model with Nonstationary Monetary Policies***by*Esteban Joan & Mitra Tapan & Ray Debraj**390-423 Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market***by*Peters Michael**424-442 Rationing and Sunspot Equilibria***by*Goenka Aditya**443-467 Linear Measures, the Gini Index, and The Income-Equality Trade-off***by*Porath Elchanan Ben & Gilboa Itzhak**468-485 Learning Equilibria***by*Bullard James**486-499 The Axiomatic Basis of Anticipated Utility: A Clarification***by*Quiggin John & Wakker Peter**500-519 Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations***by*Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio**520-530 The Normative Significance of Using Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance in Comparing Income Distributions***by*Davies James & Hoy Michael**531-540 A Note on Woodford's Conjecture: Constructing Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in a Continuous Time Model***by*Shigoka Tadashi**541-553 On Learning and the Nonuniqueness of Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Fiat Money***by*Duffy John**554-567 Hicks' Neutrality and Trade Biased Growth: A Taxonomy***by*Chambers Robert G. & Fare Rolf**568-584 Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations***by*Tian Guoqiang

### 1994, Volume 64, Issue 1

**1-19 Exact Implementation***by*Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi**20-34 Auctioning the Provision of an Indivisible Public Good***by*Kleindorfer Paul R. & Sertel Murat R.**35-65 Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies***by*Samuelson Larry**66-77 Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games***by*Blume Andreas**78-102 Sequential Equilibria and Stable Sets of Beliefs***by*Hillas John**103-114 Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing***by*Peters Michael**115-129 Anonymity and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria when Markets Are Incomplete***by*Kajii Atsushi**130-141 Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms***by*Dutta Bhaskar & Sen Arunava**142-161 On the Local Stability of Sunspot Equilibria under Adaptive Learning Rules***by*Evans George W. & Honkapohja Seppo**162-177 Oligopolistic Pricing and Advertising***by*Stahl II Dale O.**178-201 Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison***by*Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott**202-220 Non-cooperative Bargaining in Natural Monopolies***by*Winter Eyal**221-233 A Proof of the Existence of Speculative Equilibria***by*Jackson Matthew O.**234-241 A Note on Sunspot Equilibria in Search Models of Fiat Money***by*Wright Randall**242-252 Local Externalities, Convex Adjustment Costs, and Sunspot Equilibria***by*Gali Jordi**253-264 The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion***by*Shin Hyun Song**265-276 Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge***by*Borgers Tilman**277-285 A Foundation for Pareto Aggregation***by*Campbell Donald E. & Nagahisa Ryo-ichi**286-297 An Implementable State-Ownership System with General Variable Returns***by*Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi**298-300 Gift Equilibria and Pareto Optimality Reconsidered***by*Kranich Laurence

### 1994, Volume 63, Issue 2

**147-169 Optimality and the Theory of Value***by*Luenberger David G.**170-188 Dynamic Consistency Implies Approximately Expected Utility Preferences***by*Border Kim C. & Segal Uzi**189-207 Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes***by*Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair**208-218 The Foundation of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition Revisited***by*Bohm Volker**219-245 Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked***by*Thomson William**246-270 Polynomially Bounded Rationality***by*Board Raymond**271-298 Inequality Reducing and Inequality Preserving Transformations of Incomes: Symmetric and Individualistic Transformations***by*Moyes Patrick**299-325 Farsighted Coalitional Stability***by*Chwe Michael Suk-Young**326-345 Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach***by*Bossert Walter & Pattanaik Prasanta K. & Xu Yongsheng**346-369 Technology Adoption, Learning-by-Doing, and Economic Growth***by*Parente Stephen L.**370-391 A Model of Pre-game Communication***by*Rabin Matthew**392-407 Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion***by*Landsberger Michael & Meilijson Isaac**408-416 The General Existence of Extended Price Equilibria with Infinitely Many Commodities***by*Araujo A. & Monteiro P. K.

### 1994, Volume 63, Issue 1

**1-18 Introduction to the Symposium on Growth, Fluctuations, and Sunspots: Confronting the Data***by*Benhabib Jess & Rustichini Aldo**19-41 Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns***by*Benhabib Jess & Farmer Roger E. A.**42-72 Real Business Cycles and the Animal Spirits Hypothesis***by*Farmer Roger E. A. & Guo Jang-Ting**73-96 Monopolistic Competition, Business Cycles, and the Composition of Aggregate Demand***by*Gali Jordi**97-112 Divergence in Economic Performance: Transitional Dynamics with Multiple Equilibria***by*Xie Danyang**113-142 Uniqueness and Indeterminacy: On the Dynamics of Endogenous Growth***by*Benhabib Jess & Perli Roberto

### 1994, Volume 62, Issue 2

**257-293 Consumption-Portfolio Policies: An Inverse Optimal Problem***by*He Hua & Huang Chi-fu**294-320 Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs***by*Detemple Jerome & Murthy Shashidhar**321-345 A Statistical Equilibrium Theory of Markets***by*Foley Duncan K.**346-362 Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies***by*Rivard Brian A.**363-384 Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies***by*Mirman Leonard J. & Samuelson Larry & Schlee Edward E.**385-393 An Equilibrium Result for Games with Private Information and Infinitely Many Players***by*Balder E. J. & Rustichini A.**394-419 A Ricardo Model with Economies of Scale***by*Gomory Ralph E.**420-427 Two Problems in Applying Ljung's Projection Algorithms to the Analysis of Decentralized Learning***by*Moreno Diego & Walker Mark**428-443 The Strategic Effects of Long-Term Debt in Imperfect Competition***by*Glazer Jacob**444-468 Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames***by*Lambson Val Eugene**469-479 Choquet Expected Utility with a Finite State Space: Commutativity and Act-Independence***by*Hong Chew Soo & Karni Edi**480-498 The Conjunction of Direct and Indirect Separability***by*Blackorby Charles & Russell R. Robert**499-512 A Generalization of Kaneko's Ratio Equilibrium for Economies with Private and Public Goods***by*Diamantaras Dimitrios & Wilkie Simon

### 1994, Volume 62, Issue 1

**1-23 On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games***by*Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J.**24-47 Endogenous Availability, Cartels, and Merger in an Equilibrium Price Dispersion***by*McAfee R. Preston**48-69 Switching Costs and Sectoral Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk***by*Dixit Avinash & Rob Rafael**70-85 Dual Pareto Efficiency***by*Luenberger David G.**86-102 An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game***by*Chae Suchan & Yang Jeong-Ae**103-135 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players***by*Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K.**136-151 Second Price Auctions without Expected Utility***by*Neilson William S.**152-160 WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities***by*Peters Hans & Wakker Peter