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Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns

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  • Dasgupta, Amil
  • Prat, Andrea

Abstract

What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. We characterize the most revealing equilibrium of this game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders' reputational concerns has a negative effect on the extent of information that can be revealed in equilibrium but a positive effect on market liquidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Amil & Prat, Andrea, 2008. "Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 83-113, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:83-113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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