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Content
September 2007, Volume 136, Issue 1
- 668-694 Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty
by Nishimura, Kiyohiko G. & Ozaki, Hiroyuki
- 695-708 Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
by Li, Duozhe
- 709-718 Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies
by Faig, Miquel & Huangfu, Xiuhua
- 719-728 Higher-order generalizations of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk aversion: A comparative statics approach
by Jindapon, Paan & Neilson, William S.
- 729-737 Firm-specific capital, nominal rigidities, and the Taylor principle
by Sveen, Tommy & Weinke, Lutz
- 738-748 Contests with limited resources
by Kvasov, Dmitriy
- 749-758 A note on cheap talk and burned money
by Kartik, Navin
- 759-766 Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration
by Dreze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo
- 767-775 Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
by van den Brink, Rene
- 776-787 General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach
by Behrens, Kristian & Murata, Yasusada
- 788-797 The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models
by Cozzi, Guido & Giordani, Paolo E. & Zamparelli, Luca
July 2007, Volume 135, Issue 1
- 1-34 Commitment and self-control
by Noor, Jawwad
- 35-67 Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
by Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno
- 68-89 On the size and structure of group cooperation
by Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger
- 90-104 A two-person game of information transmission
by Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L.
- 105-130 Strategies as states
by Mandler, Michael
- 131-143 Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty
by Arlegi, Ricardo
- 144-158 The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
by de Clippel, Geoffroy
- 159-170 Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment
by Dominguez, Begona
- 171-195 Money, credit and banking
by Berentsen, Aleksander & Camera, Gabriele & Waller, Christopher
- 196-213 On the learnability of majority rule
by Salant, Yuval
- 214-235 Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
by Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid
- 236-252 The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
by Kim, Jaehoon & Fey, Mark
- 253-268 Reserve price signaling
by Cai, Hongbin & Riley, John & Ye, Lixin
- 269-305 The structure of strategy-proof social choice -- Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
by Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens
- 306-338 Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences
by Esteban, Susanna & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Shum, Matthew
- 339-356 Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
by Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 357-381 Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
by Bose, Subir & Zhao, Jinhua
- 382-413 Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring
by Yamamoto, Yuichi
- 414-441 Wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in two-sector economies
by Ghiglino, Christian & Venditti, Alain
- 442-457 Stochastic stability in networks with decay
by Feri, Francesco
- 458-477 When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings?
by Beaudry, Paul & Portier, Franck
- 478-494 Public goods in networks
by Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel
- 495-513 Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values
by Kadan, Ohad
- 514-532 Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
by Echenique, Federico
- 533-544 Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
by Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
- 545-550 Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
by Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto, Jose
- 551-557 More strategies, more Nash equilibria
by Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic
- 558-566 Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits
by Camargo, Braz
- 567-571 A note on recursive multiple-priors
by Wakai, Katsutoshi
- 572-578 Brown's original fictitious play
by Berger, Ulrich
- 579-589 Ordering infinite utility streams
by Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves & Suzumura, Kotaro
- 590-593 Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
by Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas
- 594-595 Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]
by Peters, Michael
May 2007, Volume 134, Issue 1
- 1-33 Ambiguous events and maxmin expected utility
by Amarante, Massimiliano & Filiz, Emel
- 34-60 Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable
by Koeppl, Thorsten V.
- 61-92 Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
by Aoyagi, Masaki
- 93-116 Credulity, lies, and costly talk
by Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco
- 117-137 Information transmission in coalitional voting games
by Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv
- 138-154 Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing
by Schulte, Elisabeth & Peter Gruner, Hans
- 155-174 Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 175-194 Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
by Sun, Yeneng & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 195-225 Coordination and delay in global games
by Dasgupta, Amil
- 226-248 Optimal search auctions
by Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
- 249-286 Voting over income taxation
by Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Ok, Efe A.
- 287-316 Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
by Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry
- 317-338 Deliberative voting
by Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat
- 339-360 Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
by Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier
- 361-378 Optimal accumulation in an endogenous growth setting with human capital
by Docquier, Frederic & Paddison, Oliver & Pestieau, Pierre
- 379-404 Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
by Krasa, Stefan & Williams, Steven R.
- 405-420 Optimal bunching without optimal control
by Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry
- 421-447 Two criteria for social decisions
by Fleurbaey, Marc
- 448-469 Short-memory equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations economies
by Citanna, Alessandro & Siconolfi, Paolo
- 470-493 The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint
by Leung, Siu Fai
- 494-512 Mixed bundling auctions
by Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny
- 513-536 Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey
by Lloyd-Braga, Teresa & Nourry, Carine & Venditti, Alain
- 537-547 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
by Ehlers, Lars
- 548-556 Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
by Xu, Yongsheng & Zhou, Lin
- 557-565 Bilateral bargaining in networks
by Polanski, Arnold
- 566-575 Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
by Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page Jr, Frank H.
- 576-582 Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
by Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A.
- 583-592 Global stability condition on the plane: A general law of demand
by Mukherji, Anjan
March 2007, Volume 133, Issue 1
- 1-30 Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance
by Matsushima, Hitoshi
- 31-57 What to maximize if you must
by Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi
- 58-82 Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
by Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej
- 83-110 The formation of networks with transfers among players
by Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew O.
- 111-126 Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization
by Vartiainen, Hannu
- 127-151 Democratic public good provision
by Hassler, John & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio
- 152-176 Optimal risk sharing with background risk
by Dana, Rose-Anne & Scarsini, Marco
- 177-198 Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games
by Ho, Teck H. & Camerer, Colin F. & Chong, Juin-Kuan
- 199-218 The effects of market structure on industry growth: Rivalrous non-excludable capital
by Koulovatianos, Christos & Mirman, Leonard J.
- 219-235 Exploitable actions of believers in the "law of small numbers" in repeated constant-sum games
by Scroggin, Steven
- 236-265 Subjective probabilities on "small" domains
by Kopylov, Igor
- 266-294 Attention economies
by Falkinger, Josef
- 295-315 On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H.
- 316-330 A subjective model of experimentation
by Hyogo, Kazuya
- 331-349 Core tatonnement
by Manea, Mihai
- 350-373 Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: A new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization
by Basu, Kaushik & Mitra, Tapan
- 374-402 Bidder collusion
by Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M.
- 403-440 Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice
by Cadenillas, Abel & Cvitanic, Jaksa & Zapatero, Fernando
- 441-466 A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
by Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 467-483 The possibility of informationally efficient markets
by Muendler, Marc-Andreas
- 484-503 The timing of contracting with externalities
by Moller, Marc
- 504-523 Decentralized learning from failure
by Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell
- 524-535 Pairwise trade and coexistence of money and higher-return assets
by Zhu, Tao & Wallace, Neil
- 536-549 Network formation and stable equilibrium
by Kim, Chongmin & Wong, Kam-Chau
- 550-567 Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam
- 568-578 Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals?
by Peluso, Eugenio & Trannoy, Alain
January 2007, Volume 132, Issue 1
- 1-26 Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
by Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka
- 27-46 Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality
by Calvo-Armengol, Antoni & Jackson, Matthew O.
- 47-69 Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
by Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H.
- 70-94 Comparative cheap talk
by Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick
- 95-118 On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
by de Vries, Sven & Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V.
- 119-136 Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals
by Landsberger, Michael
- 137-146 Invariance of conditional maximum utility
by de Palma, Andre & Kilani, Karim
- 147-166 Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
by Caruana, Guillermo & Einav, Liran & Quint, Daniel
- 167-188 Foundations of Bayesian theory
by Karni, Edi
- 189-207 Exploitation and time
by Veneziani, Roberto
- 208-235 Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
by Papai, Szilvia
- 236-273 Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
by Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny
- 274-290 The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
by Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas
- 291-305 Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
by Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico
- 306-334 Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model
by Futagami, Koichi & Iwaisako, Tatsuro
- 335-366 Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
by Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C.
- 367-382 Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
by Sandholm, William H.
- 383-410 Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
by Beggs, A.W.
- 411-434 Demographic structure and capital accumulation
by d'Albis, Hippolyte
- 435-460 A nonsmooth, nonconvex model of optimal growth
by Kamihigashi, Takashi & Roy, Santanu
- 461-473 The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K.
- 474-492 Filtral preorders and opportunity inequality
by Savaglio, Ernesto & Vannucci, Stefano
- 493-506 Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent
by Luttmer, Erzo G.J. & Mariotti, Thomas
- 507-517 On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan
- 518-529 Nonstandard foundations of equilibrium search models
by Rauh, Michael T.
- 530-538 The supercore for normal-form games
by Inarra, Elena & Concepcion Larrea, M. & Saracho, Ana I.
- 539-547 The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism
by Krishna, Aradhna & Wang, Yu
- 548-556 Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population
by Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven
- 557-568 Non-constant discounting in continuous time
by Karp, Larry
- 569-583 Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
by Gravel, Nicolas & Thoron, Sylvie
- 584-592 Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
by Vijay Krishna, R.
November 2006, Volume 131, Issue 1
- 1-25 Economic integration and agglomeration in a middle product economy
by Peng, Shin-Kun & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Wang, Ping
- 26-44 Pillage and property
by Jordan, J.S.
- 45-70 p-Best response set
by Tercieux, Olivier
- 71-100 Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart
by Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj
- 101-133 The indeterminacy of equilibrium city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns
by Berliant, Marcus & Kung, Fan-chin
- 134-156 The recursive approach to time inconsistency
by Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John
- 157-178 Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
by Han, Seungjin
- 179-211 Private monitoring in auctions
by Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul
- 212-230 Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
by Liski, Matti & Montero, Juan-Pablo
- 231-250 A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
by Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay
- 251-262 Imitation processes with small mutations
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A.
- 263-281 Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
by Zhao, Rui R.
- 282-294 Optimality in stochastic OLG models: Theory for tests
by Chattopadhyay, Subir
- 295-301 "Very Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio
September 2006, Volume 130, Issue 1
- 1-26 The micro economics of group behavior: General characterization
by Chiappori, P.A. & Ekeland, I.
- 27-43 Public trust and government betrayal
by Phelan, Christopher
- 44-77 Equilibria in systems of social interactions
by Horst, Ulrich & Scheinkman, Jose A.
- 78-94 Interactive unawareness
by Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 95-108 Search, common knowledge, and competition
by Kuksov, Dmitri
- 109-137 Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
by Ali, S. Nageeb M.
- 138-167 Joint production in teams
by Battaglini, Marco
- 168-204 On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
by Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro
- 205-219 Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
by Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan
- 220-245 Internet auctions with many traders
by Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei
- 246-263 Freedom, opportunity and uncertainty: A logical approach
by Gekker, Ruvin & van Hees, Martin
- 264-282 Bayesian beliefs with stochastic monotonicity: An extension of Machina and Schmeidler
by Grant, Simon & Polak, Ben
- 283-295 Anchored preference relations
by Sagi, Jacob S.
- 296-296 Erratum to "The taxation of trades in assets" [J. Economic Theory 126 (2006) 299-313]
by Citanna, A. & Polemarchakis, H.M. & Tirelli, M.
July 2006, Volume 129, Issue 1
- 1-30 Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
by Brusco, Sandro
- 31-56 Buy-price English auction
by Hidvegi, Zoltan & Wang, Wenli & Whinston, Andrew B.
- 57-80 Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
by Konishi, Hideo & Unver, M. Utku
- 81-113 Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
by Chade, Hector
- 114-149 Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
by Healy, Paul J.
- 150-191 Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
by Guo, Ming & Ou-Yang, Hui
- 192-224 The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
by Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya
- 225-251 Would rational voters acquire costly information?
by Martinelli, Cesar
- 252-272 Time of the essence
by Toxvaerd, Flavio
- 273-288 Prospect theory and liquidation decisions
by Kyle, Albert S. & Ou-Yang, Hui & Xiong, Wei
- 289-299 Public goods with congestion
by Birulin, Oleksii
May 2006, Volume 128, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction to model uncertainty and robustness
by Hansen, Lars Peter & Maenhout, Pascal & Rustichini, Aldo & Sargent, Thomas J. & Siniscalchi, Marciano M.
- 4-44 Dynamic variational preferences
by Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo & Rustichini, Aldo
- 45-90 Robust control and model misspecification
by Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J. & Turmuhambetova, Gauhar & Williams, Noah
- 91-135 A behavioral characterization of plausible priors
by Siniscalchi, Marciano
- 136-163 Robust portfolio rules and detection-error probabilities for a mean-reverting risk premium
by Maenhout, Pascal J.
- 164-186 Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 187-213 Equilibrium in a durable goods market with lumpy adjustment
by Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John
- 214-231 Does it matter (for equilibrium determinacy) what price index the central bank targets?
by Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S. & Ghironi, Fabio
- 232-254 Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
by Sethuraman, Jay & Teo, Chung-Piaw & Vohra, Rakesh V.
- 255-273 Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games
by Kojima, Fuhito
- 274-298 Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks
by Miao, Jianjun
- 299-305 Agreeable bets with multiple priors
by Kajii, Atsushi & Ui, Takashi
- 306-314 Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models
by Strausz, Roland
March 2006, Volume 127, Issue 1
- 1-35 Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R.
- 36-73 Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets
by Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin
- 74-116 Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions
by Bisin, Alberto & Horst, Ulrich & Ozgur, Onur
- 117-154 Building rational cooperation
by Andreoni, James & Samuelson, Larry
- 155-171 On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
by Kesten, Onur
- 172-201 Contracting with externalities and outside options
by Bloch, Francis & Gomes, Armando
- 202-231 School choice: an experimental study
by Chen, Yan & Sonmez, Tayfun
- 232-263 Dynamic price competition
by Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso
- 264-295 Intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation
by Branch, William A. & Evans, George W.
- 296-308 An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
by Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 309-322 Threshold behavior and aggregate fluctuation
by Nirei, Makoto
- 323-333 Dynamic effects of government expenditure in a finance constrained economy
by Gokan, Yoichi
January 2006, Volume 126, Issue 1
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