# Elsevier

# Journal of Economic Theory

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**Current editor:**A. Lizzeri

**Editor:**

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registered editor(s): Jess Benhabib
Alessandro Lizzeri
Karl Shell
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(Shamier, Wendy)**

**Series handle:**repec:eee:jetheo

**ISSN:**0022-0531

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### 1994, Volume 64, Issue 1

**234-241 A Note on Sunspot Equilibria in Search Models of Fiat Money***by*Wright Randall**242-252 Local Externalities, Convex Adjustment Costs, and Sunspot Equilibria***by*Gali Jordi**253-264 The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion***by*Shin Hyun Song**265-276 Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge***by*Borgers Tilman**277-285 A Foundation for Pareto Aggregation***by*Campbell Donald E. & Nagahisa Ryo-ichi**286-297 An Implementable State-Ownership System with General Variable Returns***by*Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi**298-300 Gift Equilibria and Pareto Optimality Reconsidered***by*Kranich Laurence

### 1994, Volume 63, Issue 2

**147-169 Optimality and the Theory of Value***by*Luenberger David G.**170-188 Dynamic Consistency Implies Approximately Expected Utility Preferences***by*Border Kim C. & Segal Uzi**189-207 Incentive-Compatible Cost-Allocation Schemes***by*Schmeidler David & Tauman Yair**208-218 The Foundation of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition Revisited***by*Bohm Volker**219-245 Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked***by*Thomson William**246-270 Polynomially Bounded Rationality***by*Board Raymond**271-298 Inequality Reducing and Inequality Preserving Transformations of Incomes: Symmetric and Individualistic Transformations***by*Moyes Patrick**299-325 Farsighted Coalitional Stability***by*Chwe Michael Suk-Young**326-345 Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach***by*Bossert Walter & Pattanaik Prasanta K. & Xu Yongsheng**346-369 Technology Adoption, Learning-by-Doing, and Economic Growth***by*Parente Stephen L.**370-391 A Model of Pre-game Communication***by*Rabin Matthew**392-407 Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion***by*Landsberger Michael & Meilijson Isaac**408-416 The General Existence of Extended Price Equilibria with Infinitely Many Commodities***by*Araujo A. & Monteiro P. K.

### 1994, Volume 63, Issue 1

**1-18 Introduction to the Symposium on Growth, Fluctuations, and Sunspots: Confronting the Data***by*Benhabib Jess & Rustichini Aldo**19-41 Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns***by*Benhabib Jess & Farmer Roger E. A.**42-72 Real Business Cycles and the Animal Spirits Hypothesis***by*Farmer Roger E. A. & Guo Jang-Ting**73-96 Monopolistic Competition, Business Cycles, and the Composition of Aggregate Demand***by*Gali Jordi**97-112 Divergence in Economic Performance: Transitional Dynamics with Multiple Equilibria***by*Xie Danyang**113-142 Uniqueness and Indeterminacy: On the Dynamics of Endogenous Growth***by*Benhabib Jess & Perli Roberto

### 1994, Volume 62, Issue 2

**257-293 Consumption-Portfolio Policies: An Inverse Optimal Problem***by*He Hua & Huang Chi-fu**294-320 Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs***by*Detemple Jerome & Murthy Shashidhar**321-345 A Statistical Equilibrium Theory of Markets***by*Foley Duncan K.**346-362 Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies***by*Rivard Brian A.**363-384 Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies***by*Mirman Leonard J. & Samuelson Larry & Schlee Edward E.**385-393 An Equilibrium Result for Games with Private Information and Infinitely Many Players***by*Balder E. J. & Rustichini A.**394-419 A Ricardo Model with Economies of Scale***by*Gomory Ralph E.**420-427 Two Problems in Applying Ljung's Projection Algorithms to the Analysis of Decentralized Learning***by*Moreno Diego & Walker Mark**428-443 The Strategic Effects of Long-Term Debt in Imperfect Competition***by*Glazer Jacob**444-468 Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames***by*Lambson Val Eugene**469-479 Choquet Expected Utility with a Finite State Space: Commutativity and Act-Independence***by*Hong Chew Soo & Karni Edi**480-498 The Conjunction of Direct and Indirect Separability***by*Blackorby Charles & Russell R. Robert**499-512 A Generalization of Kaneko's Ratio Equilibrium for Economies with Private and Public Goods***by*Diamantaras Dimitrios & Wilkie Simon

### 1994, Volume 62, Issue 1

**1-23 On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games***by*Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J.**24-47 Endogenous Availability, Cartels, and Merger in an Equilibrium Price Dispersion***by*McAfee R. Preston**48-69 Switching Costs and Sectoral Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk***by*Dixit Avinash & Rob Rafael**70-85 Dual Pareto Efficiency***by*Luenberger David G.**86-102 An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game***by*Chae Suchan & Yang Jeong-Ae**103-135 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players***by*Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K.**136-151 Second Price Auctions without Expected Utility***by*Neilson William S.**152-160 WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities***by*Peters Hans & Wakker Peter**161-185 Convergence Theorems on the Core of a Public Goods Economy: Sufficient Conditions***by*Conley John P.**186-208 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Walrasian Social Choice***by*Nagahisa Ryo-ichi**209-220 On the Non-neutrality of Money with Incomplete Markets***by*Gottardi Piero**221-229 A Simpler Mechanism That Stops Agents from Cheating***by*Glover Jonathan**230-237 Destroying the Pretending Equilibria in the Demski-Sappington-Spiller Model***by*Kerschbamer Rudolf**238-252 Atavistic Dynamics in a Two-Sector Economy***by*Berkowitz Daniel

### 1993, Volume 61, Issue 2

**189-205 Intertemporal Transfer Institutions***by*Esteban Joan Maria & Sakovics Jozsef**206-229 Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information***by*Allen F. & Morris S. & Postlewaite A.**230-261 Sustainable Plans and Debt***by*Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J.**262-289 Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees***by*Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio**290-301 The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game***by*Baron David & Kalai Ehud**302-330 Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard***by*Biglaiser Gary & Mezzetti Claudio**331-371 The First-Order Approach to the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility***by*Schattler Heinz & Sung Jaeyoung**372-394 Measuring Social Mobility***by*Dardanoni Valentino**395-411 On the Convergence of Informational Cascades***by*Lee In Ho**412-422 Comparative Statics under Uncertainty for a Class of Economic Agents***by*Ormiston Michael B. & Schlee Edward E.**423-435 Stationary Equilibria in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Stochastic Production***by*Wang Yong

### 1993, Volume 61, Issue 1

**1-22 Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian***by*Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel**23-41 Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules***by*Piketty Thomas**42-73 Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games***by*Bergin James & MacLeod W. Bentley**74-103 Expectationally Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study***by*Marimon Ramon & Spear Stephen E. & Sunder Shyam**104-119 Preemptive Innovation***by*Lippman Steven A. & Mamer John W.**120-138 The Demand for Housing: Theoretical Considerations***by*Dusansky Richard & Wilson Paul W.**139-159 Lp-Frechet Differentiable Preference and Local Utility Analysis***by*Wang Tan**160-168 Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game***by*Piccione Michele & Rubinstein Ariel**169-183 Ignorance in Agency Problems***by*Lewis Tracy R. & Sappington David E. M.**184-184 Erratum: Volume 57, Number 1 (1992), in the article Savage's Theorem with a Finite Number of States, by Faruk Gul, pages 99-110***by*Gul Faruk

### 1993, Volume 60, Issue 2

**217-240 Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games***by*Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio**241-276 Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games***by*Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew**277-305 Adverse Selection in the Overlapping Generations Model: The Case of Pure Exchange***by*Azariadis Costas & Smith Bruce D.**306-321 Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment***by*Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J.**322-334 Social Welfare and Measurement of Segregation***by*Philipson Tomas**335-353 Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition***by*Pascoa Mario Rui**354-377 A Model of Choice Where Choice Is Determined by an Ordered Set of Irreducible Criteria***by*Moldau Juan Hersztajn**378-409 An Elementary Approach to Approximate Equilibria with Infinitely Many Commodities***by*Nomura Yoshimasa**410-427 Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing***by*Itoh Hideshi**428-438 Subjective Expected Utility Theory with State-Dependent Preferences***by*Karni Edi**439-442 Convexity and Sunspots: Another Remark***by*Sorger Gerhard

### 1993, Volume 60, Issue 1

**1-13 Logical Structure of Common Knowledge***by*Shin Hyun Song**14-41 Non-transitive Smooth Preferences***by*Al-Najjar Nabil**42-61 How Different Can Strategic Models Be?***by*Dutta Prajit K. & Sundaram Rangarajan K.**62-82 Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives***by*Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo**83-113 The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model***by*Caillaud Bernard & Hermalin Benjamin**114-139 Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game***by*Schmidt Klaus M.**140-158 Search Market Equilibrium, Bilateral Heterogeneity, and Repeat Purchases***by*Benabou Roland**159-180 An Axiomatic Foundation for Regret Theory***by*Sugden Robert**181-190 Sunspot Equilibria and Efficiency in Economies with Incomplete Financial Markets: A Remark***by*Pietra Tito**191-212 The Declining Price Anomaly***by*McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel

### 1993, Volume 59, Issue 2

**239-256 Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium***by*Levine David K.**257-274 Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information***by*Reny Philip J.**275-287 The Timing of Information in a General Equilibrium Framework***by*Berk Jonathan B. & Uhlig Harald**288-310 The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries***by*Dana Jr. James D.**311-323 Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria***by*Yamato Takehiko**324-332 Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions***by*Denicolo Vincenzo**333-363 The Local Recoverability of Risk Aversion and Intertemporal Substitution***by*Wang Susheng**364-384 Competitive Equilibrium in Sobolev Spaces without Bounds on Short Sales***by*Chichilnisky Graciela & Heal Geoffrey M.**385-402 Optimal Information Acquisition for Heterogenous Duopoly Firms***by*Hwang Hae-shin**403-416 Experience Advantages and Entry Dynamics***by*Cabral Luis M. B.**417-425 Core Equivalence in an Overlapping Generations Model***by*Chae Suchan & Esteban Joan**426-444 The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership***by*Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim**445-450 Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model***by*Martin Stephen**451-465 The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object***by*Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio

### 1993, Volume 59, Issue 1

**1-16 Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency***by*Allaz Blaise & Vila Jean-Luc**17-32 Repeated Games with Finite Automata***by*Ben-Porath Elchanan**33-49 Updating Ambiguous Beliefs***by*Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David**50-77 A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers***by*Perry Motty & Reny Philip J.**78-95 Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information***by*Sakovics Jozsef**96-106 The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set***by*Qin Cheng-Zhong**107-121 Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments***by*Matsushima Hitoshi**122-144 Existence and Characterization of Optimal Employment Contracts on a Continuous State Space***by*Kahn Charles M.**145-168 An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining***by*Young H. P.**169-182 Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions***by*Mailath George J.**183-188 A Unifying Approach to Axiomatic Non-expected Utility Theories: Correction and Comment***by*Hong Chew Soo & Epstein Larry G. & Wakker Peter**189-198 Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge***by*Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie**199-213 The Integrability Problem of Asset Prices***by*Wang Susheng**214-221 The Value of Money in an Overlapping Generations Model: A Note***by*Burnell Stephen J.**222-234 Monopoly Pricing***by*Spulber Daniel F.

### 1992, Volume 58, Issue 2

**117-134 Introduction: Symposium on economic growth, theory and computations***by*Jones, Larry E. & Stokey, Nancy L.**135-170 Random earnings differences, lifetime liquidity constraints, and altruistic intergenerational transfers***by*Laitner, John**171-197 Finite lifetimes and growth***by*Jones, Larry E. & Manuelli, Rodolfo E.**198-218 Dynamic externalities, multiple equilibria, and growth***by*Boldrin, Michele**219-249 Communication, commitment, and growth***by*Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon**250-289 Optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model***by*Zhu, Xiaodong**290-316 Tax distortions in a neoclassical monetary economy***by*Cooley, Thomas F. & Hansen, Gary D.**317-334 Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic growth***by*Matsuyama, Kiminori**335-354 The last shall be first: Efficient constraints on foreign borrowing in a model of endogenous growth***by*Chamley, Christophe**355-376 Efficient equilibrium convergence: Heterogeneity and growth***by*Tamura, Robert**377-409 In search of scale effects in trade and growth***by*Backus, David K. & Kehoe, Patrick J. & Kehoe, Timothy J.**410-452 Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models***by*Judd, Kenneth L.

### 1992, Volume 58, Issue 1

**1-8 The set of regular equilibria***by*Balasko, Yves**9-40 Evolution and market behavior***by*Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David**41-60 Entry and R & D in procurement contracting***by*Tan, Guofu**61-76 The impossibility of involuntary unemployment in an overlapping generations model with rational expectations***by*Schultz, Christian**77-92 Sustained growth in the model of overlapping generations***by*Fisher, Eric ON.**93-104 Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded***by*Hellwig, Martin**105-109 Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation***by*Neme, Alejandro & Quintas, Luis**110-111 Corrigendum***by*Rabin, Matthew**112-113 Corrigendum***by*Berliant, Marcus & Raa, Thijs ten

### 1992, Volume 57, Issue 2

**259-277 Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory***by*Mailath, George J.**278-305 Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata***by*Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry**306-332 Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants***by*Swinkels, Jeroen M.**333-342 Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens***by*Swinkels, Jeroen M.**343-362 Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies***by*Matsui, Akihiko**363-391 Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games***by*Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo**392-406 On the evolution of optimizing behavior***by*Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne**407-419 On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics***by*Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel**420-441 Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks***by*Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C.**442-472 Average behavior in learning models***by*Canning, David**473-504 Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals***by*Boylan, Richard T.

### 1992, Volume 57, Issue 1

**1-35 Transformations of the commodity space, behavioral heterogeneity, and the aggregation problem***by*Grandmont, Jean-Michel**36-51 Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice***by*Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie**52-72 Two-part marginal cost pricing equilibria: Existence and efficiency***by*Brown, Donald J. & Heller, Walter P. & Starr, Ross M.**73-98 Classical competitive analysis of economies with Islands***by*Prescott, Edward C. & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor**99-110 Savagés theorem with a finite number of states***by*Gul, Faruk**111-124 Utility theory with probability-dependent outcome valuation***by*Karni, Edi**125-140 Implementing a public project and distributing its cost***by*Jackson, Matthew & Moulin, Hervé**141-157 Search from an unkown distribution an explicit solution***by*Talmain, Gabriel**158-175 Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies***by*Zhou, Lin**176-196 An index theorem for nonconvex production economies***by*Jouini, Elyes**197-221 Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary***by*Krasa, Stefan & Villamil, Anne P.**222-229 Differentiability and comparative analysis in discrete-time infinite-horizon optimization***by*Santos, Manuel S.**230-236 Co-existence of a representative agent type equilibrium with a non-representative agent type equilibrium***by*Aiyagari, S. Rao**237-244 An overlapping generations model with a storage technology***by*Maeda, Yasuo**245-256 Bubbles and constraints on debt accumulation***by*Kocherlakota, Narayana R.

### 1992, Volume 56, Issue 2

**235-265 Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory***by*Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.**266-293 Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms***by*Preston McAfee, R.**294-312 Differentiability, comparative statics, and non-expected utility preferences***by*Hong, Chew Soo & Nishimura, Naoko**313-337 Many good choice Axioms: When can many-good lotteries be treated as money lotteries?***by*Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Polak, Ben**338-351 Many good risks: An interpretation of multivariate risk and risk aversion without the Independence axiom***by*Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Polak, Ben**352-377 Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning***by*Bikhchandani, Sushil & Segal, Uzi & Sharma, Sunil**378-399 Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules***by*Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan**400-425 Decentralized dynamic processes for finding equilibrium***by*Reiter, Stanley & Simon, Carl P.**426-433 On nonstandard nontransitive additive utility***by*Fishburn, Peter C.**434-450 A dominant strategy double auction***by*McAfee, R. Preston**451-467 Utility functionals with nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism: The case where altruism extends to many generations***by*Hori, Hajime

### 1992, Volume 56, Issue 1

**1-19 Signed orders and power set extensions***by*Fishburn, Peter C.**20-42 Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis***by*Border, Kim C.**43-69 Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures***by*Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M.**70-88 Implementation via backward induction***by*JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay**89-99 Additively separable representations on non-convex sets***by*Segal, Uzi**100-120 Approximately rational consumer demand and ville cycles***by*Jerison, David & Jerison, Michael**121-141 On income taxation and the core***by*Berliant, Marcus**142-159 A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium***by*Howard, J. V.**160-179 On the minimum rate of impatience for complicated optimal growth paths***by*Sorger, Gerhard**180-193 Finite automata equilibria with discounting***by*Piccione, Michele**194-205 A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An [alpha]-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness***by*Kajii, Atsushi**206-217 The connectedness of the set of equilibrium money prices depends on the choice of the numeraire***by*Garratt, Rod**218-227 Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems***by*Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu**228-232 Why are idiosyncratic goods produced to order?***by*Seidmann, Daniel J.

### 1991, Volume 55, Issue 2

**229-246 Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences***by*Dekel, Eddie & Safra, Zvi & Segal, Uzi**247-273 Refining cheap-talk equilibria***by*Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew**274-295 Speculation and price fluctuations with private, extrinsic signals***by*Jackson, Matthew & Peck, James**296-322 Efficiency in partnerships***by*Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi