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Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals

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  • Landsberger, Michael

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  • Landsberger, Michael, 2007. "Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 119-136, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:119-136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    3. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-889, July.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    5. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, July.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodney Garratt & David Murphy & Travis D. Nesmith & Xiaopeng Wu, 2023. "Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-033, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Kagel, John & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ye, Lixin, 2008. "Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 697-721, March.
    3. Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019. "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 99-130.
    5. Chi, Chang Koo, 2018. "An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.

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