Endogenous supply of fiat money
We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained with commitment.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 405-424, October.
- Williamson, Stephen D, 1999.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 469-491, August.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1999. "Private money," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 469-499.
- Williamson, S.D., 1998. "Private Money," Working Papers 98-09, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1999. "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random-Matching Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 929-945, October.
- Cavalcanti, Ricardo & Erosa, Andres & Temzelides, Ted, "undated". "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random Matching Model," Working Papers 97-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised Sep 1997.
- Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1999. "Private money and reserve management in a random-matching model," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 128, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa, 1998. "Private Money And Reserve Management In A Random Matching Model," Macroeconomics 9802010, EconWPA.
- Ricardo Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Ted Temzelides, 1998. "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random Matching Model," Macroeconomics 9803008, EconWPA.
- Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti & Andres Erosa & Theodosios Temzelides, 1997. "Private money and reserve management in a random matching model," Working Papers 97-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Cavalcanti, R. & Erosa, A. & Temzelides, T., 1997. "Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random Matching Model," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9715, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Aleksander Berentsen, "undated". "Time-Consistent Private Supplie of Outside Paper Money," IEW - Working Papers 156, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Klein, Benjamin, 1974. "The Competitive Supply of Money," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(4), pages 423-453, November.
- Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1987. "Has Government Any Role in Money?," NBER Chapters, in: Money in Historical Perspective, pages 289-314 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Friedman, Milton & Schwartz, Anna J., 1986. "Has government any role in money?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 37-62, January.
- Banks, Jeffrey S & Sundaram, Rangarajan K, 1992. "Denumerable-Armed Bandits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1071-1096, September.
- Banks, J.s. & Sunderam, R.K., 1991. "Denumerable-Armed Bandits," RCER Working Papers 277, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz, 2006. "Information, learning, and the stability of fiat money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1571-1591, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)