Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe18.html
Content
June 1996, Volume 14, Issue 2
- 149-172 Bargaining Economies with Patient and Impatient Agents: Equilibria and Intermediation
by Bose, Gautam - 173-189 Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions
by Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman - 190-207 The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth
by Robson, Arthur J. - 208-219 On the Existence of Undominated Nash Equilibria in Normal Form Games
by Salonen, Hannu - 220-246 Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies
by von Stengel, Bernhard - 247-259 Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
by Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod & von Stengel, Bernhard - 260-286 Bargaining in Uncertain Environments: A Systematic Distortion of Perfect Equilibrium Demands
by Weg, Eythan & Zwick, Rami & Rapoport, Amnon - 287-295 John Nash's Contribution to Economics
by Myerson, Roger B. - 296-298 John Harsanyi and the Economics of Information
by Wilson, Robert
May 1996, Volume 14, Issue 1
- 1-18 Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case
by Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang - 19-43 Another Approach to Mutation and Learning in Games
by Amir, Madjid & Berninghaus, Siegfried K. - 44-89 An Exact Formula for the Lion's Share: A Model of Preplay Negotiation
by Bensaid, Bernard & Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - 90-123 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
by Bloch, Francis - 124-143 Potential Games
by Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S. - 144-148 A2 x 2Game without the Fictitious Play Property
by Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner
April 1996, Volume 13, Issue 2
- 141-177 Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors
by Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella - 178-200 Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo - 201-224 The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria
by Caputo, Michael R. - 225-251 Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms
by Moulin, Herve - 252-268 How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?
by Shin, Hyun Song & Williamson, Timothy - 269-285 On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games
by Watts, Alison - 286-300 On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games
by Wen, Quan
March 1996, Volume 13, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editorial
by Kalai, Ehud - 2-25 Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games
by Blume, Andreas - 26-38 An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems
by Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon - 39-73 Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms
by Cremer, Jacques - 74-99 Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu - 100-110 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs
by Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald - 111-124 Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions
by Milchtaich, Igal - 125-134 Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference
by Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst - 135-137 A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages
by Sotomayor, Marilda
February 1996, Volume 12, Issue 2
- 165-186 A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game
by Bester, Helmut & de Palma, Andre & Leininger, Wolfgang & Thomas, Jonathan & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - 187-218 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
by Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W. - 219-225 Equilibrium Selection and Consistency
by Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries - 226-244 Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives
by Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef - 245-265 The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time
by Rustichini, Aldo & Radner, Roy - 266-273 A Property of the Core
by Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal - 274-282 The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality
by Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte - 283-285 IN MEMORIAM: N. N. Vorob'ev (1925-1995)
by Korbut, A. A. & Yanovskaya, E. B.
January 1996, Volume 12, Issue 1
- 1-20 Multiplayer Bargaining Situations: A Decision Theoretic Approach
by Agastya, Murali - 21-41 Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma
by Bag, Parimal Kanti - 42-53 The Owen Value Applied to Games with Graph-Restricted Communication
by Vazquez-Brage, Margarita & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & Carreras, Francesc - 54-67 On the Existence and Formation of Partnerships
by Carreras, Francesc - 68-80 Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation
by Evans, Robert A. - 81-94 Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Identical Firms
by Pal, Debashis - 95-112 A Theory of Partnership Dynamics
by Roth, David - 113-126 Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with Permission Structures
by van den Brink, Rene & Gilles, Robert P. - 127-142 Pollination and Reward: A Game-Theoretic Approach
by Vega-Redondo, Fernando - 143-161 Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused
by Watson, Joel - 162-164 Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs
by Neeman, Zvika
November 1995, Volume 11, Issue 2
- 103-110 Introduction
by Sigmund Karl & Young H. Peyton - 111-145 The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision
by Blume Lawrence E. - 146-172 Stability by Mutation in Evolutionary Games
by Bomze Immanuel M. & Burger Reinhard - 173-192 Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?
by Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W. - 193-236 The Finite Horizon War of Attrition
by Cannings C. & Whittaker J. C. - 237-253 Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals
by Cressman R. - 254-278 Bayesian Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games
by Eichberger Jurgen - 279-303 Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation
by Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef - 304-329 Learning by Forgetful Players
by Hurkens Sjaak - 330-363 Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations
by Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton - 364-390 Invasion Dynamics of the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
by Nowak Martin A. & Sigmund Karl - 391-412 Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games
by Vega-Redondo Fernando
October 1995, Volume 11, Issue 1
- 1-35 Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution
by Binmore Kenneth G. & Samuelson Larry & Vaughan Richard - 36-63 Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play
by Brandts Jordi & Macleod W. Bentley - 64-89 Fictitious Play by Cases
by LiCalzi Marco
August 1995, Volume 10, Issue 2
- 255-283 Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
by Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 284-317 Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play
by Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M. - 318-332 A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information
by Harsanyi John C. - 333-354 How to Select a Dual Nash Equilibrium
by Jehiel P. & Walliser B. - 355-367 A Transfer Property of Equilibrium Payoffs in Economies with Land
by Legut Jerzy & Potters Jos A. M. & Tijs Stef H.
July 1995, Volume 10, Issue 1
- 1-5 Introduction
by Ledyard John O. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
by McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R. - 39-64 Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents
by Andreoni James & Miller John H. - 65-94 Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments
by Knez Marc J. & Camerer Colin F. - 95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
by Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami - 122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
by Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin - 143-170 Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game
by Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F. - 171-201 Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions
by Budescu David V. & Rapoport Amnon & Suleiman Ramzi - 202-217 Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study
by Ochs Jack - 218-254 On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
by Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W.
May 1995, Volume 9, Issue 2
- 127-138 Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms
by Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan & Young Richard - 139-150 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility
by Cheng Leonard K. & Zhu Min - 151-160 Lower Hemicontinuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
by Engl Greg - 161-171 Stochastic Common Learning
by Monderer Dov & Samet Dov - 172-190 Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences
by Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef - 191-204 Games of Fair Division
by Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William - 205-221 Bargained-Correlated Equilibria
by Tedeschi Piero - 222-233 On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding
by Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi - 234-237 Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample
by Amir Rabah - 238-246 A Note on the Probability of k Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games
by Stanford William - 247-250 Rationality and Coordination, Cristina Bicchieri, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Part of a series called Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Edited by Brian Skyrms. 270 pp. plus preface, ISBN 0-521-38123-1
by Bicchieri C.
April 1995, Volume 9, Issue 1
- 1-7 Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions
by Joosten Reinoud & Peters Hans & Thuijsman Frank - 8-20 Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games
by Jordan J. S. - 21-34 Order Independent Equilibria
by Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal - 35-65 Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
by Myerson Roger B. - 66-78 Competitively Sustainable Matching Plans with Discounting
by Green Gordon R. - 79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games
by Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew - 110-115 Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher - 116-123 A Note on Repeated Extensive Games
by Sorin Sylvain
1995, Volume 8, Issue 2
- 271-280 Commitment and observability in games
by Bagwell, Kyle - 281-296 Protective behavior in matching models
by Barberà, S. & Dutta, B. - 297-321 On the dominance solvability of large cournot games
by Börgers, Tilman & Janssen, Maarten C.W. - 322-348 Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games
by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - 349-363 Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
by Ermolov, Andrew N. - 364-377 Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma
by Harrington, Joseph Jr. - 378-388 Two examples of strategic equilibrium
by Mertens, J.-F. - 389-405 On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
by Nowak, A.S. & Radzik, T. - 406-423 "Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information
by Sonsino, Doron - 424-432 A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games
by Hsiao, Chih-Ru
1995, Volume 8, Issue 1
- 1-2 Editor's note
by Kalai, Ehud - 3-5 Nobel symposium on game theory: Rationality and equilibrium in strategic interaction
by Skyrms, Brian - 6-19 Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
by Aumann, Robert J. - 20-55 Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. - 56-90 Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
by Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry - 91-122 A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
by Harsanyi, John C. - 123-163 Subjective games and equilibria
by Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud - 164-212 Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
by Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido - 213-263 An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
by Selten, Reinhard - 264-268 The 50th anniversary of TGEB
by Lucas, William F.
November 1994, Volume 7, Issue 3
- 309-317 The Value of Large Extensive Form Games
by Cremer Jacques - 318-331 Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions
by Gale Ian L. & Hausch Donald B. - 332-345 Learning, Tracing, and Risk Dominance
by Hendon Ebbe & Jacobsen Hans Jorgen & Nielsen Michael Teit & Sloth Birgitte - 346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
by Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon - 381-389 Computable Strategies for Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
by Knoblauch Vicki - 390-405 Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games
by Lehrer Ehud - 406-427 Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games
by Leininger Wolfgang & Yang Chun-Lei - 428-440 Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games
by Perez-Castrillo J. David - 441-460 Ratio-Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria with Many Goods
by Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi - 461-472 On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences
by Valenciano Federico & Zarzuelo Jose M. - 473-475 Set-Valued Analysis, Systems & Control Series, Vol. 2. By Jean-Paul Aubin and Helene Frankowska, Birkhauser, Boston, 1990
by Nowakowska-Rozploch Danuta
September 1994, Volume 7, Issue 2
- 139-153 Option Values and Bargaining Delays
by Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B. - 154-168 Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining
by Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B. - 169-176 Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship
by Holden Steinar - 177-192 A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives
by Kukushkin Nikolai S. - 193-220 Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions
by Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter - 221-232 Zero-Sum Average Payoff Stochastic Games with General State Space
by Nowak Andrzej S. - 233-245 An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games
by Robson~ Arthur J. - 246-259 Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs
by Shalev Jonathan - 260-285 Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations
by Watson Joel - 286-294 Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies
by Weber R. J. - 295-300 The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice
by Zhou Lin - 301-307 Sharkey's Example
by Telser Lester C.
July 1994, Volume 7, Issue 1
- 1-9 Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher's Waterfall
by Basu Kaushik - 10-34 Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation
by Boylan Richard T. - 35-38 A Study on Decomposable Convex Games
by Chang Chih & Kan Ching-Yu - 39-53 Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games
by Davis Douglas D. & Holt Charles A. - 54-61 A Simple Noncooperative Core Story
by Lagunoff Roger D. - 62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
by Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry - 92-103 Some Refinements of Nash Equilibria of Large Games
by Rath Kali P. - 104-115 Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen
by Spiegel Matthew & Currie Janet & Sonnenschein Hugo & Sen Arunava - 116-138 Organizations as Teams of Automata
by Turnbull Stephen J.
May 1994, Volume 6, Issue 3
- 339-346 Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard - 347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
by Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin - 370-399 Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games
by Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David - 400-415 On Strictly Perfect Sets
by Jansen M. J. M. & Jurg A. P. & Borm P. E. M. - 416-430 Economies with Land--A Game Theoretical Approach
by Legut J. & Potters J. A. M. & Tijs S. H. - 431-444 The Inner Core of an n-Person Game
by Qin Cheng-Zhong - 445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
by Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles - 469-473 A Note on Strongly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria
by Schultz Christian - 474-501 Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms
by Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay - 502-511 Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games
by Sjostrom Tomas - 512-526 A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation
by Zhou Lin
March 1994, Volume 6, Issue 2
- 181-211 Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games
by Blume Andreas - 212-219 Extensive Coverings and Exact Core Bounds
by Bondareva O. N. & Driessen T. S. H. - 220-237 Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting
by Cronshaw Mark B. & Luenberger David G. - 238-261 Posterior Efficiency
by Forges Francoise - 262-282 Low Discounting and the Upper Long-Run Average Value in Dynamic Programming
by Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov - 283-298 On Nash Equilibrium
by McClendon J. F. - 299-311 Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher - 312-327 Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing under Asymmetric Information about Common Costs
by Salonen Hannu - 328-332 Prominence, Symmetry, or Other?
by Shubik M.
January 1994, Volume 6, Issue 1
- 1-31 An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
by Banks Jeffrey & Camerer Colin & Porter David - 32-54 Game Theory and Literature
by Brams Steven J. - 55-82 Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry - 83-96 An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions
by Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry - 97-113 Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming
by Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov - 114-129 A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality
by Lipman Barton L. - 130-149 Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games
by Monahan George E. & Sobel Matthew J. - 150-161 The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
by Nowak Andrzej S. & Radzik Tadeusz - 162-177 Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting
by Ray Debraj
October 1993, Volume 5, Issue 4
- 509-513 Adaptive Dynamics, Part II
by Crawford Vincent P. - 514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
by Farrell Joseph - 532-546 Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability
by Warneryd Karl - 547-575 Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
by Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel - 576-603 On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment
by Ben-Porath Elchanan & Dekel Eddie & Rustichini Aldo - 604-617 Evolution of Smartn Players
by Stahl Dale O. - 618-631 Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example
by Vega-Redondo Fernando - 632-646 Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability
by Evans George W. & Guesnerie Roger - 647-651 The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, By Brian Skyrms, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 199 pp., $32.50
by Bicchieri Cristina
July 1993, Volume 5, Issue 3
- 320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria
by Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M. - 368-386 Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
by Jordan J. S. - 387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
by Blume Lawrence E. - 425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
by Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry - 455-484 Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games
by Swinkels Jeroen M. - 485-504 Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication
by Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O.
April 1993, Volume 5, Issue 2
- 205-222 Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments
by Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A. - 223-226 An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games
by Chang Chih & Hsiaq Fu-Chao - 227-239 Optimal Auctions Revisited
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard