IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v21y1997i1-2p282-308.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment

Author

Listed:
  • van Damme, Eric
  • Hurkens, Sjaak

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:282-308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(97)90524-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
    3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    4. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Geir B. Asheim & Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2016. "Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-16, November.
    2. Rahul Savani & Bernhard Stengel, 2015. "Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-33, January.
    3. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    4. Keser Claudia & Gaudeul Alexia, 2016. "Foreword: Special Issue in Honor of Reinhard Selten’s 85th Birthday," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 277-283, August.
    5. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Discussion Paper 1995-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Philippe Bich, 2016. "Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games," Working Papers halshs-01337293, HAL.
    7. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    8. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April.
    10. Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April.
    11. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156.
    12. Hadi Charkhgard & Martin Savelsbergh & Masoud Talebian, 2018. "Nondominated Nash points: application of biobjective mixed integer programming," 4OR, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 151-171, June.
    13. Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2020. "A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 685-721, October.
    14. Caminati, Mauro & Innocenti, Alessandro & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2006. "Drift effect under timing without observability: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 393-414, November.
    15. Yehuda Levy, 2013. "Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 279-312, June.
    16. Weibull, Jorgen W., 1998. "Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 641-649, May.
    17. Yin Chen & Chuangyin Dang, 2016. "A reformulation-based smooth path-following method for computing Nash equilibria," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 231-246, October.
    18. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    19. Lensberg, Terje & Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus Reiner, 2021. "Cold play: Learning across bimatrix games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 419-441.
    20. Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997. "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 598, David K. Levine.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:282-308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.