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Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  2. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
  3. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Vardy, Felix, 2004. "The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 374-400, November.
  5. MITRAILLE Sébastien & MOREAUX Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly," LERNA Working Papers 07.02.223, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  6. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
  7. Sébastien Mitraille & Michel Moreaux, 2013. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 852-874, December.
  8. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:74:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
  11. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:02:n:s0219198917500086 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997. "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 598, David K. Levine.
  13. Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The quality of the signal matters -- a note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 99-106, May.
  14. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  15. Remco van Eijkel & José Luis Moraga Gonzalez, 2010. "Do Firms Sell Forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," CESifo Working Paper Series 3270, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April.
  17. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2013. "The Fragility of Commitment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(6), pages 1344-1353, June.
  18. Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006. "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October.
  19. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
  20. Ritz, Robert A., 2008. "Strategic incentives for market share," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 586-597, March.
  21. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2004. "An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 401-423, November.
  22. Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 403, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  23. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April.
  24. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2000. "Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 174-190, May.
  25. Levine, David K. & Martinelli, Cesar, 1998. "Reputation with Noisy Precommitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 55-75, January.
  26. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
  27. Elmar Wolfstetter & Brigitte Adolph, 1997. "Chain Store Paradoxon," Microeconomics 9701005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  29. Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2015. "Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the cost to re-auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 11-21.
  30. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  31. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Apr 1997.
  33. repec:eee:jeborg:v:165:y:2019:i:c:p:37-50 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2016. "Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 553-570, November.
  35. Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2013. "Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal," Discussion Paper Series 1304, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  36. Dana, James D, Jr, 2001. "Competition in Price and Availability When Availability is Unobservable," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 497-513, Autumn.
  37. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
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