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Reputation with Noisy Precommitment

  • Levine, David K.
  • Martinelli, Cesar

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5BB1-43/2/680fe13ec52a68ccc00b211ed0b95fb9
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 78 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 55-75

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:78:y:1998:i:1:p:55-75
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  2. van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1997. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Other publications TiSEM 98d6e8cb-38a1-4341-b53e-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  3. repec:att:wimass:8813 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
  6. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December.
  7. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
  8. Jonathan Eaton, 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms," NBER Working Papers 3424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Martinelli, Cesar, 1997. "Small firms, borrowing constraints, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 91-105, May.
  11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August.
  12. Allen, Franklin & Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1988. "Optimism Invites Deception," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 397-407, May.
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