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Reputation with Noisy Precommitment

  • David K. Levine
  • Cesar Martinelli

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/cesar11.pdf
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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 1987.

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Date of creation: 13 Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:1987
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Eaton, J., 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, And Credit Terms," ISER Discussion Paper 0223, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. Douglas W. Diamond, 1998. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 602, David K. Levine.
  4. van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1997. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Other publications TiSEM 98d6e8cb-38a1-4341-b53e-d, School of Economics and Management.
  5. Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  6. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  7. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  8. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74216 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Martinelli, Cesar, 1997. "Small firms, borrowing constraints, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 91-105, May.
  10. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
  12. Allen, Franklin & Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1988. "Optimism Invites Deception," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 397-407, May.
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