An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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- Julien Jacob & Eve-Angéline Lambert & Emmanuel Peterle, 2022. "Several liability with sequential care: an experiment," Post-Print hal-03830175, HAL.
- Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006.
"Noisy leadership: An experimental approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October.
- Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, "undated". "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y., 2006. "Noisy leadership : An experimental approach," Other publications TiSEM e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006.
"From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence,"
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- Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller, "undated". "From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Stiehler, A. & Müller, W., 2003. "From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining : Theory and Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 8dc1ff84-fa0c-4fee-96eb-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Stiehler, A. & Müller, W., 2003. "From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining : Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper 2003-41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Fischer, S. & Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Stiehler, A., 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining : Theory and experimental evidence," Other publications TiSEM 9d8fded2-0338-4217-afa9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
- Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019.
"Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
- Hoertnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn't?," Munich Reprints in Economics 78290, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Ilkka Leppänen, 2017. "Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(2), pages 261-285, June.
- Poulsen, Anders U. & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2004. "Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game," Working Papers 04-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
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