Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games
In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.
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|Date of creation:||Dec 1995|
|Publication status:||published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1998, 54-74|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl|
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CORE Discussion Papers RP
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