Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games
This paper introduces expectations into the framework of evolutionary games. On the one hand, (myopic) players are assumed to behave optimally according to the expectations they hold at each point of the process. On the other hand, expectations themselves are continuously updated according to the players' latest experience. The possibility of random drift on expectations (i.e., arbitrary variation on them not opposed by selection forces) produces sharp volatility across equilibria. Specifically, all Nash equilibria (but only these) have positive weight in the limit stationary distribution, independently of risk -or payoff-dominance considerations.
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