# Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

# UFAE and IAE Working Papers

Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona

Phone: 34 93 592 1203

Fax: +34 93 542-1223

Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat

Email:

More information through EDIRC

Phone: 34 93 592 1203

Fax: +34 93 542-1223

Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat

Email:

More information through EDIRC

**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Xavier Vila)**

**Series handle:**repec:aub:autbar

**Citations RSS feed:**at CitEc

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### 1995

**310.95 Fiat Exchange in Finite Economies***by*Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G.**309.95 Growth Effects of Fiscal Policy under Altruism and Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution***by*Caballe, J.**308.95 On the Survival of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Large Populations***by*Palomino, F.**307.95 Innovation, 'Bank' Monitoring and Endogenous Development***by*de la Fuente, A. & Marin, J.M.**305.95 Social Learning and Rational Expectations***by*Vives, X..A.**304.95 Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle***by*Fairburn, J.A. & Malcomson, J.M.**303.95 Gross Worker Flows: How Does the Spanish Evidence Fit the Stylized Facts?***by*Antolin, P.**302.95 Spurious Multicointegration***by*Marmol,F.**301.95 What Happened to Job Search Behaviour in Spain During the Recovery Period (1987-1991)?***by*Antolin,P.**300.95 Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case***by*Maschler, M.**299.95 the Failling Rate of Profit. Entry, Exit, and Coordination with Mixed Strategies***by*Vettas, N.**298.95 Cost Reducing Strategies***by*Gosalbez, M.P.**297.95 The Hound of the Baskervilles: Natural Resources in Marx's Explination of the Failling Rate of Profit***by*Petith, H.C.**296.95 Entrepreneurs, Optimism, and the Competitive Edge***by*Manove, M.**295.95 An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior***by*Bolton, G. & Katok, E.**294.95 The Empirics of Growth and Convergence: A Selective Review***by*de la Fuente, A.**293.95 Convex and Concave Transportations Costs in Spatial Competition***by*Hamoud, h. & Jarque, X.**292.95 Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions***by*Barbera, S.**291.95 Maket versus Limit Orders in an Imperfectly Competitive Security Market***by*Adan, L.A.M.**290.95 Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt***by*Macho-Stadler, I. & Perez-Castillo, D.**285.95 Price Advertising and Coupons in a Monopoly Market***by*Caminal, R.**284.95 On the Concept of Weak Sustainability***by*Gutes, M.C.**273.94 Semi-Nonparametric Distribution-Free Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation***by*Creel, M. & Loomis, J.

### 1994

**279.94 The Partnered Core of an Economy***by*Wooders, M.**271.94 Arbitrage in Markets with Unbounded Short Sales: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonemptiness of the Core and Existence of Equilibrium***by*Page, F.H.Jr. & Wooders, M.H.

### 1993

**223.93 Unions, Governments, Price Level and Unemployment***by*Sorolla, V.**222.93 Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard***by*Persson, T. & Tabellini, G.**221.93 On the Measurement of Polarization***by*Esteban, J. & Ray, D.**219.93 Structural Stability of Planar Hamiltonian Polynomial Vector Fields***by*Jarque, X. & Llibre, J.**218.93 A Note on Random Preferences and Welfare Estimation***by*Greel, M.D.**217.93 Welfare Estimation Using the Fourier Form: Simulation Evidence for the Recreation Demand Case***by*Greel, M.D.**216.93 The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design***by*Macho, I. & Martinez-Giralt, X. & Perez-Castrillo, D.**215.93 Nominal Rigidities when Agents Care About Aggregate Demand***by*Bet-Mansour, A.E.**214.93 Bargaining with Non Stationary Preferences***by*Burgos, A.**209.93 Competition and Cooperation within a Multidivisional Firm***by*Fauli-Oller, R.**208.93 Two Systems of Wage Setting***by*Sorolla, V.**207.93 Short-Term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market***by*Vives, X.**206.93 Learning from Others***by*Vives, X.**205.93 Financial Intermediation with Proprietary Information***by*Bhattacharya, S.**204.93 Weak Lower Subdifferentiability in Fractional Programming***by*Boncompte, M. & Martinez-Legaz, J.E.**203.93 After all Hotelling Was (Almost) Right***by*Garella, P.G. & Martinez-Giralt, X.**201.93 Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring***by*Olivella, P.

### 1992

**200.92 Voting Under Constraints***by*Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A.**198.92 The Cost Function and the Non-Neutrality of money: A Note***by*Bet-Mansour, A.E.**197.92 Bargaining at Variable Rythms***by*Martinez, X. & Ponsati, C.**196.92 Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems***by*Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S.**195.92 Learning and Convergence to Rational Expectations with Persistent Shocks***by*Jun, B. & Vives, X.**194.92 Mediation Is Necessary for Efficient Bargaining***by*Ponsati, C. & Sakovics, J.**193.92 Competition for Deposits, Risk of Failure, and Regulation in Banking***by*Matutes, C. & Vives, X.**192.92 Why Do Market Shares Matters? An Information-Based Theory***by*Vives, X. & Ramon, C.**187.92 Equilibrium Assignment of Players in Team Matches : game Theory for Tennis Coaches***by*Hamilton, J. & Romano, R.**186.92 The Separation and Timing of Allocation and Distribution in Second-Best Economies***by*Hamilton, J. & Slutsky, S.**185.92 Optimal Rental of Durable with Learning by Using***by*Burguet, R.**184.92 Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees***by*Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E.**183.92 Revolution and Triumph of Capitalism as Alternative Outcomes in a Marxian Growth Model with Decreasing Returns***by*Petith, H.C.**182.92 Efficient Monetary Equilibrium : An Overlapping Generations Model with Nonstationary Monetary Policies***by*Esteban, J. & Mitra, T. & Ray, D.**181.92 Costly Transfer Institutions and the Core in an Overlapping Generations Models***by*Esteban, J. & Engineer, M. & Sakovics, J.**180.92 Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers***by*Perez-Castrillo, J.D.**179.92 Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment***by*Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Macho-Stadler, I.**178.92 Coase vs. Pacman: Who Eats Whom in the Durable Goods Monopoly?***by*Von Der Fehr, N.H.M. & Kuhn, K.U.**177.92 Coalitional Manipulations in an State-Sharing Problem***by*Casado, M.A.F.**176.92 A Note on Reserve Requirements and Public Finance***by*Caminal, R. & Bacchetta, P.**175.92 International Fiscal Policy Games with Aggregate Demand Spillovers***by*Caminal, R. & Pages, C.**174.92 The Speed of Information Revelation in a Financial Market Mechanism***by*Vives, X.**173.92 Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments***by*Bacchetta, P. & Paz Espinosa, M.**172.92 Intertemp[oral Transfer Institutions***by*Esteban, J.M. & sakovics, J.**171.92 On the Measurement of Polarization***by*Esteban, J.M. & Ray, D.**170.92 An Entropy Formula for Class of Circule Maps***by*Alseda, L. & Falco, A.**169.92 Exploitation and the Falling Rate of Profit in a marxian Growth Model with Decreasing Returns***by*Petith, H.C.**168.92 A Subgame-Perfect Implementable Social Choice Correspondebnce Failing to Be Nash Implementable***by*Sertel, M.R. & Yilmaz, B.**167.92 Social Indifference Curves with Optimal Second-Bast Taxation***by*Brito, D. & Hamilton, J. & Slutsky, S.**166.92 A Menu Cost Model of the International Transmission of Monetary Policy***by*Bet-Mansour, A.E.**165.92 Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games***by*Peraz-Castrillo, J.**164.92 Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play***by*Macleod, B. & Brandts, J.

### 1991

**191.92 Edgeworth and Modern Oligopoly Theorem***by*Vives, X.**190.92 Multiplier Analysis with Flexible Cost Functions***by*Sancho, F.**189.92 Modeling Proces in a Sam Structure***by*Roland-Holst, D.W. & Sancho, F.**188.92 Ralative Income Determination in the United States: A Social Accounting Perspective***by*Roland-Holst, D.W. & Sancho, F.**163.91 Algebraic Properties of Effectivity Functions***by*Gurvich, V.A.**162.91 Tight Cyclic Game Forms***by*Gurvich, V.A. & Golberg, A.I.**161.91 Little Perfection and Complexity***by*Neme, A.**160.91 Axiomatic Characterizations of the Duality Correspondence in Theory***by*Martinez-Legaz, J-E.**159.91 Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games***by*Masso, J. & Neme, A.**158.91 Endogeneous Growth, Human Capital and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model***by*Caballe, J.**157.91 Protective Behaviour in Matching Models***by*Barbera, S. & Dutta, B.**156.91 Duality Between Direct and Indirect Preferences***by*Martinez-Legaz, J-E. & Santos, M.S.**153.91 Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems***by*Olivella, P. & Aron, D.J.**152.91 The Dedline Effect: A Theoretical Note***by*Obiols, C.P.

### 1990

**155.91 Resale-Proof Trades of Information***by*Nakayama, M. & Quintas, L. & Muto, S.**154.91 Stable Payoffs in Resale-Proof Trades of Information***by*Nakayama, M. & Quintas, L.**151.91 Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining Over Many Issues***by*Obiols, C.P.**150.91 Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information***by*Obiols, C.P.**149.90 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Plant Pollination: Pollinator-Scarce VS. Pollinator-Abundant Contexts***by*Vega-Redondo, F. & Dafni, A.**148.90 A Game-Theoretic Model of Predator-Prey Signalling.***by*Vega-Redondo, F. & Hasson, O.**147.90 Strategic Market Processes in an Evolutionary Context***by*Vega-Redondo, F.**146.90 Technological Change and Institutional Inertia; A Co-Evolutionary Model with Two Hierarchical Levels***by*Vega-Redondo, F.**145.90 Technological Change and Path Dependence: A Co-Evolutionary Model on a Directed Graph***by*Vega-Redondo, F.**144.90 The Functioning of Cooperatives Under Renegotioation.***by*Ray, D.**143.90 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation***by*Neme, A. & Quintas, L.**142.90 Bundling Subscription TV Channels***by*Chae, S.**141.90 Insights or Forecasting? An Evaluation of a Simple CGE Model of Spain***by*Polo, C. & sancho, F.**140.90 An Analysis of Spain's Integration in the EEC***by*Polo, C. & sancho, F.**139.90 Dominance and Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence***by*Brandt, J. & Holt, C.A.**138.90 A general Equilibrium Approach to trade and Industrial Policy : The Case of Spain***by*Polo, C. & Roland-Holst, D. & Sancho, F.**137.90 Market Versus Limit Orders***by*Caballe, J.**136-90 Basing Point Pricing: Competition Versus Collusion***by*Thisse, J-F. & Vives, X.**135-90 How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn?***by*Vives, X.**134-90 Memory Startegies In Nonatomic Repeated Games***by*Masso, J.

### 1989

**133-90 Information Control In Simultaneous Moves Games***by*Olivella, P.**132.90 Insider Trading and asset Pricing in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi- Secrity Market***by*Caballe, J. & Krishnan, M.**130.90 Evidence of risk Premia in Foreign Currency Futures Markets***by*McCurdy, T.H. & Morgan, I.G.**129.90 Implementation in economies with a Continuum of Agents***by*Vives, X. & Mas-Colell, A.**128-89 Ecological And Economic Valuation***by*Martinez-Alier, J.**127-89 Differentiability And Comparative Analysis In Discrete-Time Infinite-Horizon Optimization Problems***by*Santos, M.S.**126-89 Optimal Leasing With Learning And Commitment***by*Verde, R.B.**125-89 Collusion By Asymmetricaly Informed Firms***by*Kihlstrom, R. & Vives, X.**124-89 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria In Continuous Time Games***by*Bergin, J. & Macleod, B.**123-89 Fair Division Under Joint Ownership: Recent Results And Open Problems***by*Moulin, H.**122-89 Autoregressive Models With Sudden Variance Changes At Unknown Points***by*Inclan, C.**121-89 Eficiency And Renegotiation In Repeated Games***by*Bergin, J. & Macleod, B.**120-89 Welfare Bounds And Fair Allocation Of Private Goods***by*Moulin, H.**119-89 Smoothness Of Policy Function In Discrete Time Economic Models***by*Santos, M.S.**118-89 Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence From Two-Stage Games With Complete Information***by*Brandts, J. & Holt, C.A.**117-89 Uniform Externalities: Two Axioms For Fair Allocation***by*Moulin, H.**116-89 Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital***by*Kanemoto, Y. & Macleod, B.**114.89 Wage Premiums And Profit Maximization In Efficiency Wage Models***by*Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M.**113-89 Labour Turnover And The Natural Rate Of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage V.S Frictional Unemployment***by*Macleod, B.W. & Malcomson, J.M.**108-89 An Evolutionary Model Of Technological Change***by*Redondo, F.V.

### 1988

**115-89 The Contribution Of Publicity Provided Inputs To The State'S Economies***by*Garcia-Mila, T. & Mcguire, T.J.**112-89 Smoothness Of Policy Function In Continuous Time Economic Models: The One Dimensional Case***by*Santos, M.S. & Vila, J-L.**111-89 Entry, Sunk Costs And Renegotiation In Duopoly***by*Macleod, W.B. & Bergin, J.**110-89 Spacial Competition And The Core***by*Hamilton, J.H. & Macleod, W.B. & Thisse, J-F.**109-89 Dynamical Systems That Solve Continuous-Time Concave Optimization Problems Anything Goes***by*Montrucchio, L.**107-88 Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities***by*Vives, X.**106-88 Welfare Bounds In The Fair Division Problem***by*Moulin, H.**105.88 Collusion By Asymmetrically Informed Duopolists***by*Vives, X. & Kihlstrom, R.E.**104-88 On Brand Proliferation With Vertical Differentiation***by*Giralt, X.M.**103-88 Configurations Of Fans And Nests Of Limit Cycles For Polynomial Vector Fields In The Plane***by*Llibre, J. & Cima, A.**102-88 Bounded Polynomial Vectro Fields***by*Cima, A. & Llibre, J.**101-88 Algebraic And Topological Classification If The Homogeneous Cubic Vector Fields In The Plane***by*Cima, A. & Llibre, J.**100-88 Information And Competitive Advantage***by*Vives, X.**99-88 Public Projects And Private Contributions***by*Vega, F.**98-88 Bayesian Boundedly Rational Agents Play The Finitely Repeated Prisoner'S Dilemma***by*Vega, F.**97-88 An Extension Of The Tevelation Principle***by*Burguet, R.**96-88 Security Retrading On New Information In Incomplete Market***by*Chae, S.**95-88 Voting By Quota And Committee***by*Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H.**94.88 Strong Egalitarian Allocations***by*Dutta, B. & Ray, D.**91.88 Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences***by*Barbera, S. & Peleg, B.**90.88 Inflation And Optimal Price Adjustment Under Monopolistic Competition***by*Caminal, R.**89.88 Social Welfare And Equality***by*Dutta, B. & Esteban, J.**88.88 Nash Equilibria And Collusive Effects Through Price Dispersion In Duopolies***by*Lal, R. & Matutes, C.**87.88 Social Insurance And Population Uncertainty: Demographic Bias And Implications For Social Security***by*Brandts, J. & Bartolome, C.A.M.

### Undated

**547.02 Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions***by*Santiago S?chez-Pag?**546.02 Information Extraction and Exclusivity***by*Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli**545.02 Social Capital, Modernization and Growth***by*Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli**543.02 When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflD72icts***by*Francis Bloch & Santiago S?chez-Pag? & Raphael Soubeyran**541.02 Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production***by*Carmen Bevia & Luis Corchon**539.02 Stable Condorcet Rules***by*Salvador Barber?Author-Name: Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es**513.02 A proposal for a new specification for a conditionally heteroskedastic variance model: the Quadratic Moving-Average Conditional Heteroskedasticity and an application to the D. Mark-U.S. dollar Exchange Rate***by*Daniel Ventosa**508.02 Unemployment and Wage Formation in a Growth Model with Public Capital***by*Xavier Raurich & Valeri Sorolla**497.01 Growth, Habit Formation, and Catching-up\ with the Joneses***by*Jaime Alonso-Carrera & Jordi Caball?Author-Email: jordi.caballe@uab.es & Xavier Raurich**493.01 Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games***by*Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es & Luis C. Corch?n & Simon Wilkie**475.01 Redistribution and Subsidies for Higher Education***by*Carmen Bevia & I?go Iturbe-Ormaetxe**468.00 Self-Selection Consistent Functions***by*Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber?**465.00 Optimal Regulation of Specialized Medical Care in a Mixed System***by*Porteiro-Fresco, Nicol?**462.00 Competition Between Conglomerate Firms In A Multimarket Oligopoly***by*Diego Lanzi**461.00 Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value***by*David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein**459.00 Macroeconomic Effects In Centralized And Decentralized Wage Setting Systems***by*Valeri Sorolla-i-Amat**458.00 Growth, Unemployment And The Wage Setting Process***by*Valeri Sorolla-i-Amat**457.00 An Algorithm To Compute The Set Of Many-To-Many Stable Matchings***by*Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo**456.00 The Chi-Compromise Value For Non-Transferable Utility Games***by*Gustavo Berganti?os & Jordi Massó**455.00 Long Run Unemployment, Growth And Inflation***by*Xavier Raurich & Valeri Sorolla**454.00 Retribution In A Cheap-Talk Experiment***by*Jordi Brandts & Gary Charnes**453.00 Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design Of Financial Claims***by*Giacinta Cestone & Lucy White**452.00 A Semi-Nonparametric Estimator For Counts With An Endogenous Dummy. Variable***by*Andr? Romeu-Santana & ?gel M. Vera-Hern?dez**451.00 The Role Of Measurement Error In Rational Expectations Testing***by*Michela Nardo & Maite Cabeza-Gut?**450.00 Tests Of Rationality With Quantitative Data: A Survey***by*Maite Cabeza-Gut?**449.00 The Redistributive Effects Of The Eu Budget: An Analysis And A Proposal Reform***by*?gel de la Fuente & Rafael Dom?ech**448.00 Endogenous Formation Of Partnerships With Moral Hazard***by*Mar? Paz Espinosa & Inés Macho-Stadler**447.00 Convergence Across Countries And Regions: Theory And Empirics***by*?gel de la Fuente**446.00 Human Capital In Growth Regressions: How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make?***by*?gel de la Fuente & Rafael Dom?ech**445.00 On The Determinants Of Cost Performance And The Decomposition Of Returns To Scale Measures In The Presence Of Quasi-Fixed Inputs. A Comment On Morrison And Schwartz (1996) And Related Work***by*?gel de la Fuente**444.99 Waiting Lists And Patient Selection***by*Pedro Pita Barros & Pau Olivella**443.99 DIVERSITY AND SPECIALISATION IN CITIES. Why, where and when does it matter?***by*Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga**442.99 North-South Environmental Debate: Strategic Price Distortions And Capital Flows***by*Roberto Burguet & Jaime Sempere**441.99 The Production Of Goods In Excess Of Demand: A Generalization Of Self Protection***by*Carole Haritchabalet**440.99 Delegated Bargaining And Renegotiation***by*Helmut Bester & J?sef S?ovics**439.99 Right To Choose In Oral Auctions***by*Roberto Burguet**438.99 Public And Private Provision Of Healtch Care***by*Pedro P. Barras & Xavier Martinez-Giralt**437.99 Public Capital And Imperfect Competition***by*Javier Coto**436.99 Aggregate R&D Expenditure And Endogenous Economic Growth***by*M Jess Freire-Ser?**435.99 Human Capital Accumulation And Economic Growth***by*M Jess Freire-Ser?**434.99 Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem***by*Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme**433.99 Strategic Experimentation In A Durable Goods Duopoly***by*Carole Haritchabalet