Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.
|Date of creation:||12 Mar 2003|
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- Murat Sertel, 2000.
"Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments,"
0014, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.
- James Schummer, 1997.
"Manipulation Through Bribes,"
1207, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007.
"Bribe-proof rules in the division problem,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 331-343, November.
- Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2002.
"Bribing and Signalling in Second Price Auctions,"
1357, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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