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Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment


  • Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
  • Flip Klijn


  • Estela S?chez


In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Suggested Citation

  • Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Flip Klijn & Estela S?chez, 2003. "Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 561.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:561.03

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eso, Peter & Schummer, James, 2004. "Bribing and signaling in second price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 299-324, May.
    2. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.
    3. Schummer, James, 2000. "Manipulation through Bribes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 180-198, April.
    4. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "Bribe-proof rules in the division problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 331-343, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "Bribe-proof rules in the division problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 331-343, November.
    3. repec:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:75-84 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    matching; endowments; manipulation;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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