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Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

  • Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Sanchez, Estela

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-4B0X7R0-2/2/138037716b53eb2beeb3ba780f9ce125
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 295-312

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:3:p:295-312
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. James Schummer, 1997. "Manipulation Through Bribes," Discussion Papers 1207, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 571.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.
  4. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2002. "Bribing and Signalling in Second Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1357, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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