Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.
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