Long-Term and Short-Term Labour Contracts Versus Long-Term and Short-Term Financial Contracts
This paper has three objectives: first to analyze the interaction between the basic internal contracts that shape the firm (labour and financial contracts). In particular we show how their temporal dimension are related. The linkage between firm's internal contracts and the project choice (short-term or long-term) is the second objective of our study. Finally, we check how sensitive are the type of financial intermediary (banks or markets) to the relations previously studied. These results allow us to rationalize several facts to characterize the US-UK financial system and the German-Japanese one. Finally, as a direct implication our theoretical model, some empirical tests are proposed which are particularly relevant to describe some features of the Spanish economy.
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