Training, Minimum Wage, and Employment. A Simple Dynamic Analysis
The paper presents a model where an increase in minimum wage may determine an increase in employment. The mechanism through which this effect occurs is via effort and training. When minimum wage increases, some of the low paid workers are dismissed, but other are retained and required to work harder. Because they work harder, it is worth their employer's while to train them more. Therefore, when the minimum wage increases, some low paid workers receive better training.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona|
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:417.98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.