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An Explicit Bound on epsilon for Non-Emptiness of the epsilon-Core of an Arbitrary Game with Side Payments

Author

Listed:
  • Kovalenkov, A.
  • Holtz Wooders, M.

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a paramaterized collection of games with side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in such a collection have non-emplty epsilon-cores. A parametrized collection of games is described by (a) the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this approximation, (b) the size of approximately effective small groups, and (c) the size of the bound on maximal per capita payoffs achievable in coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kovalenkov, A. & Holtz Wooders, M., 1997. "An Explicit Bound on epsilon for Non-Emptiness of the epsilon-Core of an Arbitrary Game with Side Payments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 393.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:393.97
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Economic Research Papers 269410, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Wooders, Myrna & Selten, Reinhard & Cartwright, Edward, 2001. "Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames: Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies," Economic Research Papers 269360, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECONOMETRICS;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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