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Citations for "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known"

by Tracy R. Lewis

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  1. John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  2. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  3. Tarui, Nori & Polasky, Stephen, 2003. "Environmental Regulation With Innovation And Learning: Rules Versus Discretion," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21911, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  4. Huber, Claus & Wirl, Franz, 1998. "The Polluter Pays versus the Pollutee Pays Principle under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 69-87, January.
  5. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2004. "Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches to Mitigating Climate Change," Working Papers 2004-28, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
  7. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
  8. Anthony Heyes and John Maxwell, 2003. "Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/5, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003.
  9. Arvind Magesan & Matthew A. Turner, 2008. "The Value of Information in Public Decisions," Working Papers tecipa-345, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & McKitrick, Ross & Rollins, Kimberly S., 1999. "Optimal Compensation For Endangered Species Protection Under Asymmetric Information," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21693, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  11. Stephen P. Holland & Michael Moore, 2008. "When to Pollute, When to Abate? Intertemporal Permit Use in the Los Angeles NOx Market," NBER Working Papers 14254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Porteiro, Nicolas, 2008. "Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 156-175, January.
  13. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
  14. Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Fatih Karanfil, 2011. "Environmental regulation in the presence of unrecorded economy," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 126-127, pages 91-108.
  16. Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2015. "Can Poorly Informed Regulators Hinder Competition?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 433-461, July.
  17. Chambers, Paul E. & Jensen, Richard A., 2002. "Transboundary Air Pollution, Environmental Aid, and Political Uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 93-112, January.
  18. Woodward, Richard T, 2010. "Double Dipping in Environmental Markets," MPRA Paper 26185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Watzold, Frank, 2000. "Efficiency and applicability of economic concepts dealing with environmental risk and ignorance," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 299-311, May.
  20. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, 2001. "Environmental Taxation and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Spaeter, Sandrine & Verchère, Alban, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), INRA (French National Institute for Agricultural Research), vol. 71.
  22. Burtraw, Dallas & Parry, Ian & Goulder, Lawrence & Williams III, Roberton, 1998. "The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting," Discussion Papers dp-98-22, Resources For the Future.
  23. Rüdiger Pethig, 1999. "On the Future of Environmental Economics," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 77-99, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  24. Charles Mason & Andrew Plantinga, 2011. "Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality," NBER Working Papers 16963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Donovan, Charles & Nuñez, Laura, 2012. "Figuring what’s fair: The cost of equity capital for renewable energy in emerging markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-58.
  26. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Activists versus Captured Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 4444, CESifo Group Munich.
  27. Fabio Antoniou & Nikos Tsakiris, 2016. "On the Informational Superiority of Quantities Over Prices in the Presence of an Externality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 227-250, September.
  28. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of "Ex Post" Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582.
  29. Katrin Millock, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring: a New Challenge for the Regulation of Energy Externalities," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 68(4), pages 635-646.
  30. Osmundsen, Petter, 2002. "Regulation of common property resources under private information about resource externalities," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 349-366, November.
  31. Stephen Holland & Andrew J. Yates, 2014. "Optimal Trading Ratios for Pollution Permit Markets," NBER Working Papers 19780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Post-Print hal-01201071, HAL.
  33. Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2002. "Rethinking local commons dilemmas: Lessons from experimental economics in the field," Artefactual Field Experiments 00020, The Field Experiments Website.
  34. Miyamoto, Takuro, 2014. "Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 141-167.
  35. MAHENC Philippe, 2006. "Lemons are Green: The Informative Role of a Pigovian Tax," LERNA Working Papers 06.05.198, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  36. Matveenko, V., 2010. "Stimulating Mechanisms in Ecologically Motivated Regulation: Will Ecological Policies in Transition and Developing Countries Become Efficient?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 8, pages 10-34.
  37. Polasky, Stephen & Doremus, Holly, 1998. "When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 22-47, January.
  38. Maurice D. Levi & Barrie R. Nault, 2004. "Converting Technology to Mitigate Environmental Damage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(8), pages 1015-1030, August.
  39. Sheriff, Glenn, 2009. "Implementing second-best environmental policy under adverse selection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 253-268, May.
  40. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2000. "Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 181-202, May.
  41. Kennedy Peter W & Laplante Benoit & Whittington Dale, 2010. "Simple Pricing Schemes for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-37, February.
  42. Guasch, J Luis & Hahn, Robert W, 1999. "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 137-158, February.
  43. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
  44. Stephen Polasky, 2009. "Conservation economics: economic analysis of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 1-20, March.
  45. Séverine Blaise, 2011. "L'après Kyoto : quelle approche face au changement climatique ?," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 103-120.
  46. Bartzokas, Anthony & Yarime, Masaru, 1997. "Technology Trends in Pollution-Intensive Industries: A Review of Sectoral Trends," UNU-INTECH Discussion Paper Series 06, United Nations University - INTECH.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.