Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment
Minimum standards set by a ‘World Environmental Organisation’ (WEO) and NGO labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO ‘alternative’ increases industry resistance to WEO proposals and this may reduce welfare. If, however, the schemes are run in parallel, existence of the NGO lessens producer opposition to WEO activities. This allows the WEO to be ‘bolder’ in its proposals, which is good for welfare.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:978-996. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.