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The Polluter Pays versus the Pollutee Pays Principle under Asymmetric Information

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  • Huber, Claus
  • Wirl, Franz

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  • Huber, Claus & Wirl, Franz, 1998. "The Polluter Pays versus the Pollutee Pays Principle under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 69-87, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:35:y:1998:i:1:p:69-87
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 819-847, Winter.
    2. Mancur Olson, 1996. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 3-24, Spring.
    3. Amann, Markus & Hordijk, Leen & Klaassen, Ger & Schopp, Wolfgang & Sorensen, Lene, 1992. "Economic restructuring in Eastern Europe and acid rain abatement strategies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(12), pages 1186-1197, December.
    4. Leung, Michael C. M., 1992. "Pollution, taxation, and strategic behaviour," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 251-255, October.
    5. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March.
    6. Freeman, A. III, 1984. "Depletable externalities and pigouvian taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-179, June.
    7. Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, 1996. "Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 149-172, June.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1996. "The core disagreement between Pigou, the profession, and Coase in the analyses of the externality question," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 565-579, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 2007. "Eternal Coase and external costs: A case for bilateral taxation and amenity rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 641-659, September.
    2. repec:zbw:hohpro:336-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2011. "International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities," Working Papers V-336-11, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
    4. Helm, Carsten & Wirl, Franz, 2014. "The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 141-154.
    5. Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2015. "Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations," ISER Discussion Paper 0948r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2017.
    6. repec:old:wpaper:336-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Mark Cohen & V. Santhakumar, 2007. "Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(3), pages 599-620, July.

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