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The Theory of Contracts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1999. "Job characteristics, wages, and the employment contract," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 13-27.
  2. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March.
  3. K.P. Kannan & N. Vijayamohanan Pillai, 2001. "The political economy of public utilities: A study of the power sector," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 316, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
  4. Marcelo Bianconi, 2004. "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Behavior of Individual Preferences under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0410, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  5. Malcomson James M, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
  6. Savvateev Alexey, 2003. "Strong equilibrium implementation for a principal with heterogeneous agents," EERC Working Paper Series 00-103e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  7. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
  8. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
  9. Brice Corgnet & Simon Gaechter & Roberto Hernan Gonzalez, 2020. "Working Too Much for Too Little: Stochastic Rewards Cause Work Addiction," Discussion Papers 2020-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  10. Carstensen, Vivian, 2000. "Employment Stability via Annualized Hours Contracts," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-230, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  11. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
  12. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2008. "Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 352-377, June.
  13. Christian Calmès, 2003. "Poignée de main invisible et persistance des cycles économiques : une revue de la littérature," Staff Working Papers 03-40, Bank of Canada.
  14. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  15. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 887, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  16. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.
  17. Paarsch, Harry J & Shearer, Bruce, 2000. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 59-92, February.
  18. David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-Contingent Bank Regulation with Unobserved Actions and Unobserved Characteristics," Working Papers wp2004_0407, CEMFI.
  19. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2003. "Equilibrium Incentive Contracts," Working Paper Series 3/2003, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  20. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Alexandros Karakostas, 2020. "An experimental investigation of the ‘tenuous trade-off’ between risk and incentives in organizations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 153-190, February.
  21. Harald Oberhofer & Marian Schwinner, 2017. "Do Individual Salaries Depend On the Performance of the Peers? Prototype Heuristic and Wage Bargaining in the NBA," WIFO Working Papers 534, WIFO.
  22. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
  23. Goodrich, Brittney K. & Goodhue, Rachael E., 2020. "Are All Colonies Created Equal? The Role of Honey Bee Colony Strength in Almond Pollination Contracts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
  24. Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce Shearer, 1997. "On the Elasticity of Effort for Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-31, CIRANO.
  25. Carstensen, Vivian, 1999. "Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-228, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  26. Philip H. Dybvig & Heber K. Farnsworth & Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2010. "Portfolio Performance and Agency," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 1-23, January.
  27. John McMillan & John Whalley & Zhu Li Jing, 1987. "Incentive Effects of Price Rises and Payment-System Changes on Chinese Agricultural Productivity Growth," NBER Working Papers 2148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Zhang, Weiying, 1998. "A Principal-Agent Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to China," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 31(2-3), pages 231-251.
  29. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
  30. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 306-328, Summer.
  31. Eid, Florence, 2001. "Applying the decision rights to a case of hospital institutional design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2726, The World Bank.
  32. Pedro Telhado Pereira & Pedro Silva Martins, 2004. "Returns to education and wage equations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 525-531.
  33. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
  34. L'aszl'o K'allay & Tibor Tak'acs & L'aszl'o Trautmann, 2020. "Transaction Costs: Economies of Scale, Optimum, Equilibrium and Efficiency," Papers 2008.10348, arXiv.org.
  35. Marco Arnone & Umberto Giacometti, 2004. "Crescita, Innovazione Tecnologica e Mercato dei Capitali: il Ruolo del Venture Capital," Finance 0404008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
  37. Christian Calmès, 2005. "Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle," Staff Working Papers 05-1, Bank of Canada.
  38. Galal, Ahmed & Nauriyal, Bharat, 1995. "Regulating telecommunications in developing countries : outcomes, incentives, and commitment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1520, The World Bank.
  39. Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2005. "Performance Pay and Adverse Selection," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(2), pages 279-298, June.
  40. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Norms and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 8286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Pasquale Lucio Scandizzo, 2004. "Financing Technology: An Assessment of Theory and Practice," CEIS Research Paper 43, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  42. Gorton, Gary B. & Pennacchi, George G., 1995. "Banks and loan sales Marketing nonmarketable assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 389-411, June.
  43. Walls, Margaret, 2003. "How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts," Discussion Papers dp-03-62, Resources For the Future.
  44. Mohebalian, Phillip M. & Aguilar, Francisco X., 2018. "Design of tropical forest conservation contracts considering risk of deforestation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 451-462.
  45. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2005. "Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative," CEPR Discussion Papers 5067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  46. Palomino, Frederic & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 113-137, Spring.
  47. Jha, Anand & Kim, YoungJun & Gutierrez-Wirsching, Sandra, 2019. "Formation of cross-border corporate strategic alliances: The roles of trust and cultural, institutional, and geographical distances," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 22-38.
  48. Azaridis, C, 1987. "Human Capital and Self-Enforcing Contracts," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 281, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  49. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Ownership Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights," DRUID Working Papers 99-4, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  50. Bruce Shearer, 1994. "Piece-Rates, Principal-Agent, and Productivity Profiles: Parametric and Semi-Parametric Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-16, CIRANO.
  51. Dan Elfenbein & Josh Lerner, 2001. "Links and Hyperlinks: An Empirical Analysis of Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999," NBER Working Papers 8251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  52. Nicolai J. Foss, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts and Economic Organization Brian Loasby and the Theory of the Firm," DRUID Working Papers 97-11, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  53. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," IEW - Working Papers 038, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  54. Karni, Edi, 2006. "Subjective expected utility theory without states of the world," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 325-342, June.
  55. Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October.
  56. Zsolt Bihary & P'eter Cs'oka & P'eter Ker'enyi & Alexander Szimayer, 2019. "Self-respecting worker in the gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," Papers 1902.10021, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
  57. Canıtez, Fatih & Çelebi, Dilay & Deveci, Muhammet & Kuvvetli, Yusuf, 2019. "Selecting an optimal contractual payment model for Istanbul's public bus operators using non-linear mathematical programming," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
  58. Constanza M. Fosco Perea M, "undated". "Ambigüedad estratégica en contratos públicos de suministro," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv127, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  59. S. Ho, 2008. "Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 31-58, February.
  60. Chuanlong Tang & Sumner J. La Croix, 1993. "The Role of Transaction-Specific Capital and Market Structure in Contracting: Evidence from Japan's Overseas Coking Coal Procurement," Working Papers 199314, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  61. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts: Over and Under Investment of Concessioned Public Infrastructure," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv106, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  62. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2005. "Technological design and moral hazard," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 91(Fall), pages 43-55.
  63. Azariadis, Costas, 1987. "Human Capital And Self-Enforcing Contracts," Economic Research Papers 268330, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  64. Robert Drago & John S. Heywood, 1994. "The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data," Labor and Demography 9402001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Feb 1994.
  65. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2001. "Regulating bank capital structure to control risk," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 35-52.
  66. Barron, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 0. "Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  67. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  68. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
  69. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
  70. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  71. Georgiadis, George & Szentes, Balázs, 2020. "Optimal monitoring design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 104062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  72. Luis Almeida Costa & Joao Amaro de Matos, 2000. "Afinity, animosity and organizational design," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp372, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
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