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Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2002:i:spr:p:87-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Boyd, John H. & Chang, Chun & Smith, Bruce D., 2002. "Deposit insurance: a reconsideration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1235-1260, September.
    2. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Senbet, Lemma W., 1991. "Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 895-915, September.
    3. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    4. Black, Fischer & Miller, Merton H & Posner, Richard A, 1978. "An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 379-412, July.
    5. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    6. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    7. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn.
    9. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Martin, 2003. "A guide to deposit insurance reform," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 88(Q I), pages 29-54.
    2. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    3. Huberto M. Ennis & H. S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 91(Spr), pages 21-44.
    4. Stephen F. LeRoy & Rish Singhania, 2020. "Deposit insurance and the coexistence of commercial and shadow banks," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 159-194, June.
    5. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Chernykh, Lucy & Kotomin, Vladimir, 2022. "Risk-based deposit insurance, deposit rates and bank failures: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    7. Nizar, Muhammad Afdi & Mansur, Alfan, 2019. "Premi Penjaminan Simpanan Berbasis Risiko: Studi Kasus LPS Indonesia [Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premium: A Case Study of Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC)]," MPRA Paper 97894, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Dec 2019.
    8. Kaelo Mpho Ntwaepelo, 2023. "Bank Stability versus Financial Development: A Generous Deposit Insurer's Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2023-09, Department of Economics, University of Reading.

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    Keywords

    Deposit insurance; Risk;

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