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Expansion of commercial banking powers ... or, universal banking is the cart, not the horse

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  • Boyd, John H.

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  • Boyd, John H., 1999. "Expansion of commercial banking powers ... or, universal banking is the cart, not the horse," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 655-662, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:23:y:1999:i:2-4:p:655-662
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John H. Kareken, 1983. "Deposit insurance reform or deregulation is the cart, not the horse," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 7(Spr).
    2. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    3. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    4. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    5. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Battilossi, 2009. "Did governance fail universal banks? Moral hazard, risk taking, and banking crises in interwar Italy1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(s1), pages 101-134, August.
    2. Andreani, Ettore, 2003. "Corporate Control and the Financial System in Germany: Recent Changes in the Role of Banks," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 37, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    3. Karlo Kauko, 2014. "Do Bailouts Cause Moral Hazards or Franchise Value in Banking?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 82-92, February.
    4. Nadia Bensaci, 2008. "L’analyse de la banque selon le paradigme de la finance et l’examen du modèle de banque universelle en France," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 127-142.
    5. Berger, Allen N. & Demsetz, Rebecca S. & Strahan, Philip E., 1999. "The consolidation of the financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 135-194, February.
    6. HAKIMI Abdelaziz & Ahmet DKHILI Hichem & KHLAIFIA Wafa, 2012. "Universal Banking and Credit Risk: Evidence from Tunisia," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 2(4), pages 496-504.
    7. Karlo Kauko, 2018. "Bailouts, Franchise Value And Moral Hazard In Banking," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 63(03), pages 691-699, June.

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