Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan
We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system since the 1990s. Following Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001), we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of largest shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these "entrenched banks" extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2004|
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- Fukao, Mitsuhiro, 2001. "Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market Discipline, and Market Development: Japan's Experience and Lessons for Developing Countries," CEI Working Paper Series 2001-17, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Hoshi, Takeo, 2002. "The convoy system for insolvent banks: how it originally worked and why it failed in the 1990s," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 155-180, April.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, 2004. "Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582481, July.
- Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, 02.
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