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Les mécanismes internes de gouvernance dans les banques:un état de l'art

  • Karima Bouaiss

    (Université de Tours)

  • Christine Marsal

    (Université de Bourgogne)

(VF)Comparée aux firmes classiques, la gouvernance des banques fait preuve de nombreuses spécificités liées aux particularités de ce secteur. En effet, la gouvernance des banques se singularise par l’importance des mécanismes externes (comme la réglementation) aussi bien qu’internes (essentiellement à travers le rôle joué par le conseil d’administration) afin de discipliner le comportement du dirigeant pour qu’il agisse dans les intérêts des actionnaires. S’intéressant uniquement aux mécanismes internes de gouvernance, cet article propose une revue de la littérature des différents travaux s’interrogeant sur les systèmes de contrôle et d’incitation du dirigeant mis en place par le conseil d’administration au sein des banques.(VA)In comparison with industrial firms, bank governance is specific. Bank governance is made up of both external mechanisms such as banking regulation and internal mechanisms such as the board of directors. The objective of these mechanisms of governance is to discipline managers’ behaviour in order to satisfy shareholders’ interests. In this article, we only deal with the internal mechanisms of bank governance. We propose a survey of the incentive and control systems implemented by the board of directors of banks.

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Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 93-126

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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2009:i:q1:p:93-126.
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