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Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks

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  • Stephen D. Prowse

Abstract

In this article, Stephen Prowse investigates how owners of commercial banks encourage management to follow value-maximizing policies. While the "corporate control mechanism" in nonfinancial firms is well documented, for the banking industry much less evidence is available. Moreover, unique factors in the operating environment of commercial banks may mean that their corporate control mechanism operates differently from that of nonfinancial firms. ; Prowse analyzes a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1987 to 1992 to determine how many underwent a change in corporate control by hostile takeover, friendly merger, action by the board of directors, or intervention by regulators. Prowse finds that the primary market-based corporate control mechanism among BHCs is action by the board, although bank boards appear to be much less assertive than boards of nonfinancial firms. Overall, the market-based corporate control mechanisms in banks do not appear as efficient at disciplining managers as they are in other firms. By default, this has given a primary role to regulators to provide a "last resort" control mechanism. Prowse analyzes reasons for this and evaluates how proposed banking legislation might affect corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedder:y:1995:i:qiii:p:24-36
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    File URL: http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/er/1995/er9503c.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Köhler, Matthias, 2009. "Blockholdings and corporate governance in the EU banking sector," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-110 [rev.], ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Palvia, Ajay A., 2011. "Banks and managerial discipline: Does regulatory monitoring play a role?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 56-68, February.
    3. Philip E. Strahan, 2004. "Commentary on "Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks"," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 109-113.
    4. Azofra, Valentín & Santamaría, Marcos, 2011. "Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1464-1476, June.
    5. Ilduara Busta & Bersant Hobdari, 2015. "Board effectiveness in the European banking industry," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1), pages 25-41.
    6. Christophe Godlewski, 2004. "Modélisation de la Prévision de Défaillance Bancaire Une Application aux Banques des Pays Emergents," Finance 0409026, EconWPA.
    7. Stephen Prowse, 1997. "Corporate Control In Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-527, December.
    8. Laetitia Lepetit & Amine Tarazi & Nadia Zedek, 2012. "Ultimate Ownership Structure and Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment: Evidence from European Commercial Banks," Working Papers hal-00918579, HAL.
    9. Hyun, Jung-Soon & Rhee, Byung-Kun, 2011. "Bank capital regulation and credit supply," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 323-330, February.
    10. Köhler, Matthias, 2008. "Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-110, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    11. Garci­a-Marco, Teresa & Robles-Fernández, M. Dolores, 2008. "Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 332-354.
    12. Christophe Godlewski, 2004. "Modélisation de la Prévision de Défaillance Bancaire et Facteurs Réglementaires Une Application aux Banques des Pays Emergents," Finance 0409027, EconWPA.
    13. Gropp, Reint & Köhler, Matthias, 2010. "Bank owners or bank managers: who is keen on risk? Evidence from the financial crisis," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-013, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    14. Irina Barakova & Ajay Palvia, 2010. "Limits to relative performance evaluation: evidence from bank executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(3), pages 214-236, August.
    15. Joseph G. Haubrich & James B. Thomson, 1998. "Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: a clinical study of Mellon Bank," Working Paper 9803, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    16. Robert R. Moore, 1997. "Bank acquisition determinants: implications for small business credit," Financial Industry Studies Working Paper 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    17. Karima Bouaiss & Christine Marsal, 2009. "Les mécanismes internes de gouvernance dans les banques:un état de l'art," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 93-126, March.
    18. Christophe Godlewski, 2004. "Excess Credit Risk and Bank’s Default Risk An Application of Default Prediction’s Models to Banks from Emerging Market Economies," Finance 0409028, EconWPA.
    19. Sullivan, Richard J. & Spong, Kenneth R., 2007. "Manager wealth concentration, ownership structure, and risk in commercial banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 229-248, April.
    20. Laetitia Lepetit & Amine Tarazi & Nadia Zedek, 2012. "Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment and Ultimate Ownership Structure: Evidence from European Commercial Banks," Working Papers hal-00918577, HAL.
    21. Chen, Hsiao-Jung & Lin, Kuan-Ting, 2016. "How do banks make the trade-offs among risks? The role of corporate governance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(S), pages 39-69.
    22. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Staff Reports 29, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    23. Crespi, Rafel & Garcia-Cestona, Miguel A. & Salas, Vicente, 2004. "Governance mechanisms in Spanish banks. Does ownership matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 2311-2330, October.

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    Banks and banking ; Corporations;

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