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Excess Credit Risk and Bank’s Default Risk An Application of Default Prediction’s Models to Banks from Emerging Market Economies

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  • Christophe Godlewski

    (LaRGE, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg 3)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the regulatory and institutional factors which may increase excessive risk taking in banks. Few studies deal with the impact of these external factors on bank’s risk taking and probability of default, despite the fact that empirical investigation is crucial for understanding the relationship between the regulatory, legal and institutional environement and bank’s health, especially in emerging market economies. We apply a two step logit model to a database of banks from emerging market economies. Our results confirm the role of the institutional and regulatory environment as a source of excess credit risk, which increases bank failure risk. The integration of these environmental variables significantly contributes to the explanatory and discriminatory power of our model of bank default prediction.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Godlewski, 2004. "Excess Credit Risk and Bank’s Default Risk An Application of Default Prediction’s Models to Banks from Emerging Market Economies," Finance 0409028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0409028
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    excess credit risk; bank default; emerging market economies; institutional factors of default; two step logit model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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