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Banking System Failures in Developing and Transition Countries: Diagnosis and Prediction

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  • P. Honohan

Abstract

Understanding what caused the recent costly wave of banking system failures in developing and transition economies is the key to preventing a recurrence. It is important to distinguish between epidemics of the macroeconomic and micro-economic varieties, and between these and the syndrome of endemic failure, associated with pervasive government involvement. Each type has its characteristic warning signs - the availability of the relevant indicators is discussed in some detail - and a comprehensive prevention policy must take account of each.
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  • P. Honohan, 2000. "Banking System Failures in Developing and Transition Countries: Diagnosis and Prediction," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 29(1), pages 83-109, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecnote:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:83-109
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