IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_2_409871.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Le rôle du secteur privé dans le financement des infrastructures : une mise en perspective historique

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Debande

Abstract

[fre] L'efficacité d'un partenariat privé-public repose sur un partage clair des res­ponsabilités et des risques liés à la mise en œuvre des projets d'infrastructure. L'analyse historique du développement des infrastructures de transport en Europe et aux États-Unis montre que la forme institutionnelle de l'intervention des pou­voirs publics n'est pas neutre. En effet, étant donné les garanties explicites ou implicites données par les pouvoirs publics aux prêts bancaires et l'internalisation par l'État de la valeur sociale de ces projets, les partenaires privés sont incités à poursuivre des stratégies impliquant des prises de risque excessives. De telles stratégies sont favorisées par certaines caractéristiques propres aux projets d'infrastructure comme la forme de financement sans recours, la forte incertitude sur les coûts et la demande ainsi que la complexité des arrangements contrac­tuels et financiers. [eng] The efficiency of the private intervention in infrastructure investments rests on an optimal allocation of liabilities and risks between the private sector and the government. The historical analysis of transport infrastructures' development in Europe and in the United-States shows that the institutional form of the governe-ment intervention is not neutral. Given the implicit or explicit government guaran­tee on banks credits and the social value assigned to the project by the government, private partners may have an incentive to follow excessive risk-taking strategies. Such strategies are encouraged by the following factors : the non-recourse dimension of financing projects, the level of uncertainty on costs and demand and the complexity of the contractual and financial structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Debande, 1997. "Le rôle du secteur privé dans le financement des infrastructures : une mise en perspective historique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(2), pages 197-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_2_409871
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1997.409871
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409871
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.1997.409871
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_2_409871
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/reco.1997.409871?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlos Ann M. & Lewis Frank D., 1995. "The Creative Financing of an Unprofitable Enterprise: The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, 1853-1881," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 273-301, July.
    2. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Nanda, Vikram, 1993. "Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 475-497.
    3. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 1-74.
    4. Eichengreen, Barry, 1995. "Financing Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Railway Age," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 10(1), pages 75-91, February.
    5. Aschauer, David Alan, 1989. "Is public expenditure productive?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-200, March.
    6. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 541-555.
    7. van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Banking: A Survey of Recent Microeconomic Theory," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 10(4), pages 14-33, Winter.
    8. Lewis, Frank & MacKinnon, Mary, 1987. "Government Loan Guarantees and the Failure of the Canadian Northern Railway," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 175-196, March.
    9. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    10. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1994. "The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 424-440, Autumn.
    11. Chaney, Paul K. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1985. "Incentive effects of benevolent intervention : The case of government loan guarantees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 169-189, March.
    12. Fleisig, Heywood, 1975. "The Central Pacific Railroad and the Railroad Land Grant Controversy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 552-566, September.
    13. Rogerson, William P, 1989. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1284-1305, December.
    14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    15. Aschauer, David Alan, 1989. "Does public capital crowd out private capital?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-188, September.
    16. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. Spiegel, Yossef, 1994. "The Capital Structure and Investment of Regulated Firms under Alternative Regulatory Regimes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 297-319, September.
    18. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Schwartz, Amy Ellen, 1995. "Infrastructure in a structural model of economic growth," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 131-151, April.
    19. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    20. Augenblick, Mark & Custer, B. Scott, 1990. "The build, operate, and transfer ("BOT") approach to infrastructure projects in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 498, The World Bank.
    21. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    22. Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fay, Marianne & Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2021. "Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    2. Majumdar, Sumit K., 2016. "Debt and communications technology diffusion: Retrospective evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 458-474.
    3. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    4. Carlo Altavilla & Miguel Boucinha & José-Luis Peydró & Frank Smets, 2019. "Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers," Working Papers 1137, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2022. "A puha költségvetési korlát - II [The soft budget constraint II]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 94-132.
    6. Clive Stones, 2007. "Risk Sharing, the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(2), pages 139-159, March.
    7. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    9. Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2009. "Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 69-84, September.
    10. AURIOL, Emmanuelle & PICARD, Pierre, 2004. "Liberal regulation : privatization of natural monopolies with adverse selection," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    12. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
    13. Hakimi, Abdelaziz & Hamdi, Helmi, 2013. "The duration of bank relationships and the performance of Tunisian firms," MPRA Paper 55754, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
    14. Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, 2009. "Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1464-1493, October.
    15. Atif Ansar & Bent Flyvbjerg & Alexander Budzier & Daniel Lunn, 2016. "Does infrastructure investment lead to economic growth or economic fragility? Evidence from China," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 32(3), pages 360-390.
    16. Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, 2008. "Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, November.
    17. Filippo Belloc, 2014. "Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(3), pages 821-848.
    18. Poot, Jacques, 1999. "A meta-analytic study of the role of government in long-run economic growth," ERSA conference papers ersa99pa171, European Regional Science Association.
    19. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Blanc, Aymeric, 2009. "Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-216, June.
    20. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2007. "On the virtues of privatization when government is benevolent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 17-34, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_2_409871. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.